Philosophy 460: First Meeting, Thursday, March 29

The seminar proposes an exploratory venture in reflective thought. It is my hope that the collection of essays written since The Inward Morning may serve to center this venture and broach some themes in need of further exploratory interpretation as we go along; so far forth I seek your participation as collaborators in my own work and a renewed sense of directions which I might yet take. At the same time a study of certain writings of Marcel and Heidegger should prove of indispensable help to us in pursuit of our common venture. The extent of my own indebtedness to Marcel will be clear to those of you who have read The Inward Morning, and the sixth and seventh essays in the collection we will be using go further in addressing concerns which I have shared with Marcel. My encounter with Heidegger's thought did not begin until 1957, and to this day it remains a matter to be worked out in explicit address to it. As to the significance of reflective encounter, Marcel's comments in his introduction to The Inward Morning – middle of page 18 through the middle of page 19 -- may prove suggestive. And Heidegger's own writings are replete with suggestive considerations on encounter with fundamental thinkers and poets. We touched briefly in our meeting on the need which Heidegger often points out for radical recovery of the root traditions from within which our own thinking transpires; and one can see him thus engaged with the origins of Western philosophical tradition in Greek thought. Incidentally, it seems to me equally important for reflection to be similarly concerned with radical recovery of the root traditions of the Old and New Testaments, and that Heidegger's thought suffers from tending to stop short of that effort and to confine itself, at least explicitly, to commentary on subsequent Christian theology. For years – at leas t since 1946 – my thinking too place within a concern for understanding the being of beings under the impact of their presencing, as registering experientially and as though within an ontological tradition which led me back to Parmenides, with most important inflections, as it seemed t me, in Aristotle, in Spinoza, and in Kant. Hegel's Phenomenology, too, was in itself a schooling in a style of though. At any rate, having gotten into the swim of an ontological tradition which spoke powerfully to my experience, I was primed for the encounter, first with Marcel and later with Heidegger, as they spoke to what I took to be experientially founded ontological concern. Since 1970, however, in work shared with my colleagues, John Lawry and Ray Lanfear, and also by way of a reeducation undergone with them thought the Intensive Humanities Program, I have been drawn to considerations which arise as fundamental in the Old and New Testaments, with Augustine's Confessions as a major guide in reflective interpretation of these thematic considerations. So far I must confess that I cannot do without the language of being – of beings in their and in our being, yet I have come to share with John Lawry a profound uneasiness concerning its uncritical dominance of thought. I think you will see how address-response comes to be thematically more and more central in my little essays; and it will be of great interest to me to examine in certain writings of Heidegger whether, and to what extent, 'the question of Being' does not yield in point of ultimacy to more fundamental considerations in which address-response becomes central. I suspect the issue which I am adumbrating will bring us to consider acknowledgment as a primordial mode of knowing.

It is a slow and difficult matter to discover in a somewhat more radical way 'what one may always have been about.' This qualifies the work of reflection as 'thematic' and it seems to warrant taking up with things again and again within 'a soft focus' – as I put it in our meeting the way it seems advisable to take up with things thematic in the mythical idiom, for example, or even as that literally applies in learning to see, as Vincent Van Gogh and his paintings suggest.

With regard to finding one's way in reflection I was moved to comment on the power of things to work on one, from which one may receive one's own voice and articulate realization of what may ask acknowledgment of us in an idiom appropriate to us: for example, the power of mythical promptings, such as we might think to discern as having worked on Sophocles to engender the first and then the second of the Oedipus plays. Or the power of past experience speaking with authority in the recollection, say, of Augustine, moving him to the reflections according a present to things past – as in his response to the pear-tree episode and to the death of his friend (as opposed to his pronouncement upon things past – as seems the case with his account of his interest in stage plays and perhaps also of his conversion). Or again as suggested by Thoreau: "And we are enabled to apprehend at all what is sublime and noble only by the perpetual instilling and drenching of the reality that surrounds us." (Walden and Other Writings, Modern Library, 1937, p. 87). A certain matter-of-factness, patient of what may come of this in time, seems essential; such 'outcomes' cannot be forced though they require to be heeded and carried out. If it can be said, as he says (p. 101), "…we are in danger of forgetting the language which all things and events speak without metaphor, which alone is copious and standard," the danger may lie in leaping on things perceptually evident and concluding upon that in the stead of their coming in time to resonate cumulatively and echo upon one, so that they give one voice. We will take note of how this goes with Vincent in his work as a painter. (Note middle paragraph, p. 152 also of p. 156, and the last complete paragraph of page 162 in our edition of Dear Theo).

I posed the possibility that we might find Vincent an instructive precursor of our time. He suggests an estrangement from received tradition and cannot merely fall back on its origins. Yet its origins continue to speak to him and prompt a reckoning appropriate to the destinate existence within which he in his own time must come to live, to work, to think, and to speak.

Perhaps I should conclude these notes appended to our initial meeting by recalling what I ventured to say from having thought over a paper written by Dave Strong at the end of Albert's course in The Inward Morning last quarter. The paper on the one hand as it pertains to active response in genuine commitment and decision, on the other hand as it pertains to creaturely existence. It has troubled me more to do justice to this latter sense in which necessity may obtain, yet I suspect it is also profoundly bound up with necessity as it may obtain for us in active response and decision. As I was reflecting on this matter before coming to our meeting it came to me with clarity and authority from of old: necessity in the latter sense is to be found in creatures as fulfilling God's word. There is the prompting from of old, the striking of a key note. What orchestration in thought and speech consonant with our own destinate time may be called for; may it be possible? A

long way down the ramifications of destinate existence from the Old Testament sounding enunciation of that theme. Can a reflective appeal to our own experience fathom anything like that; in our own lived world? Can we find a way of saying what may fundamentally need to be said by us – in a clarifying, indeed in realizing fashion?

Second Meeting, Tuesday, April 3

Thematic in the first essay of our collection are (1) 'criteria of reflective judgment,' (2) 'la duree historique,' and (3) a question concerning the distinction and correlation between 'the rational' and the 'non- (or extra) rational' – a distinction to which people repeatedly had recourse during the colloquium "Orient-Occident" on which the essay reflects. The discussion of these themes is opened and closed in the essay (in the manner of a prelude and a coda) with the acknowledgment of the colloquium itself as having taken place in the mode of "enduring encounter." This founding experience of the colloquium is reflectively developed in treating the three major themes in a somewhat coherent and unified manner, the thought on each tending to join with that on the others. I am saying that the experience of the colloquium extended into the further reflection on the themes which had been discussed there, guiding and tending to found the thought on them: on the situational character of reflective judgment-criteriological as such judgment may well become; on the destinate character of temporal existence; and on the unity in reasonableness of 'cognition' and commitment. We did not manage to reach the third theme in our discussion.

The discussion of 'criteria of judgment,' as the theme was broached in the colloquium, expatiated on the situational character of criteriological judgment within which active commitment in the very response embodying such judgment is likely to be essential to its genuineness and relevance in actual discrimination. Such judgments may come to us as appropriate reminders in situations within which they remain relevant with the force of conviction, but then I think they are to be distinguished from methodological or procedural rules, and perhaps even from maxims or precepts which we simply 'apply.' In the course of responsible existence we noted in Buddhist tradition the provisional relevance of guiding moral considerations in that tradition, likened to a raft – so times and relevant in a fluid situation in which one is on the move and liable to otherwise to founder: If one comes to shore and proceeds accordingly it would not be pertinent to continue with the raft, packing it on one's back. We recalled, too, Virgil's parting advice to Dante (Purgatorio, Canto XXVII, lines 139-142): "…here your will is upright, free, and whole, and you would be in error not to heed whatever your own impulse prompts you to…" As Kant might forcibly remind us, inclination may also (and for a long undisciplined time) hardly be that trustworthy, though it appears that for Kant inclination could never become trustworthy since he treats inclination in contrariety with "rational will" – die Wille. Let me add in this connection that Kant does not seem to consider the possibility of disciplined response as incarnation of the life of spirit, of embodiment in our very bodily lives, so that our very bodily desires are inclinations are susceptible to transfiguration according to the mode of being and sponsorship in which we can be ourselves. (cf. Marx Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Struik, lower

half of p. 139). At about this point we entered into some discussion of the critical predicament of Jim in Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim, but I will not attempt to go into that here. With Kant coming to mind the discussion of judgment moved to the consideration of reflective judgment preeminently. One sees this theme adumbrated in the Transcendental Dialectic, where self, world, and God become centrally thematic, in his view (and properly so, I think) for thought. Surely the range of reflective judgments in his work extends into the province and the presuppositions of 'the moral life,' the judgment(s) of beauty, of the sublime, and 'teleological' judgment. Such reflective judgment in all its range cannot, as he maintains, be substantiated in the empirical mode – in the manner of scientific knowledge. Since Kant does not distinguish experiential thought from empirical thought (see the attempt at such a distinction running through The Inward Morning), I believe he misses the mode of knowing which requires experiential grounding in the end, and which underlies our endeavors in reflective judgment: namely, acknowledgment (which cannot be forced), as beholden to authority which speaks to us and which we do not originate. So much for now on reflective judgment.

The bulk of our meeting went toward implementing the discussion of 'la duree historique' in the first essay. The phrase clearly alludes to temporal existence and our human implication in it; I take 'historic' to intend the events of the lives of the people taken in continuity from time immemorial and in point of what is of moment in these events, even to the point of assuming the perduring character of a sharing in human destiny, with all the myriad inflections of meaning of these events within which they tend to occur and ambiguously qualify our sense and our understanding of human existence as a destinate affair. For those with whom I have not worked before a distinction was briefly drawn between 'destiny' and 'fate' in our vocabulary of reflection. (cf. Inward Morning, pages 142-146).

Before getting down to 'la duree historique' in the context of the colloquium we gave some thought to historical inquiry. Thucydides could have served our purpose well in his scrupulous intent to leave to fact – an intent which he sharply demarcates from mythical tales and poetic conjuring, as one might put the way he sees what is going on in Homeric epics. His intent, to be sure, is to deal with momentous events, and it is of no slight interest to note the criteria of greatness which he makes explicit in a prefatory approach to his narration of the Peloponnesian war. But now how does he bring out the significance, the momentousness of the events embraced in his narrative? Is it not in large measure by bringing out powerfully the dramatic force of the events in question, above all in presenting directly in dialogue how people involved in these events were taking their and coming to act as they did? When one reads the Melian Dialogue, for example, with the background of the Corinthians' speech on the Athenians and Pericles' eulogy on Athens well in mind, does one not grasp the tragedy of Athens? Consider too his account of the Revolution at Corcyra, down to the detail of what is happening there in language as well as in actions, isn't the meaning of what is occurring integral to the grasp of historical fact in this vivid and searching narrative?
In contrast with history as an exhumation of a past of 'dead fact,' I suggested reading someday William Carlos Williams' In The American Grain, or Mari Sandoz' account of

the life of her father in Old Jules. Barnes' One Hundred Years of American Independence could be read in contrast, say, with Muzzey's American History. Closer to home, for that matter, Ross Toole's historical work and Maxine Van de Wetering's work in the history of science seem to exemplify historical knowledge being brought to historical insight and understanding, so that one is brought nearer to what may actually have been taking place – in its significance. The task here is clearly that of an hermetical grasp of fact ('factum': past participle signifying a deed that has been done). Well, indeed, Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C. and the imperialistic die was cast.

The discussion on duree historique in the colloquium turned into a discussion of human bondage and freedom with respect to temporal existence.

For those who have not worked with the Bhagavad-Gita – on which my own thought was drawing – I sought to bring out the force of "the sense of ego" as it plays in the Gita's analysis of bondage. Implicit in the understanding of this theme, "attachment" is always also at issue. At any rate, our reflection dwelt on the meaning of human agency, beginning from noting a dual connotation: an agent is surely a being who acts in a sense implying the responsibility of the one who acts in and for actions; yet we may distinguish further a stronger connotation, that of one who acts in behalf of, in service of…, in the name of… on the strength of… And that led us to consider enabling power, sponsoring power, authorizing power, animating power; and as one may discover that coming to one. Such power as one bears witness to in the enabled response. I suggest that such power is fundamentally evocative, such as to call on one and to call forth what may be called for. We began to work with phenomenological preliminaries to discernment of the sense in which we seem to be graced in the reception of enabling power, not possessed of it. The logic of the matter explored lay in distinguishing between the genuine reception of enabling power and presuming upon power so as to annex it to oneself as a possession one might assent title to (the latter is a key to what may be renounced in renunciation, with the enabling power received in devotion – wherein the way of freedom is necessarily "a way of renunciation and devotion," as set forth in Essay I). Let me add the comment that in speaking of enabling power as authorizing power I mean this in the twofold sense of initiatory power as sponsoring our initiative and as warranting power. Such power seems to come to us as 'working on us' and bringing us to the 'knowing' meant by acknowledgment.

We have some thought to Dante's dramatization of delusion with respect to power in the Inferno. Perhaps therein we may understand the saying with respect to the souls in Hell that they "have lost the good of intellect." (Canto III, line 18). One notes that Satan, the "Father of Lies" and "the Source of All Our Woes" is reduced to the ultimate impotence of freezing himself in with the futile expenditure of seemingly most formidable power. . . .and his mouths, crammed with 'arch-sinners,' are impotent for speech. We thought briefly toward the end of how we may be worked on fundamentally in both joy and sorrow, tying this in with that Rilke may mean by cleaving to the difficult and what we may find Heidegger concerned with, e.g., in talking of 'pain' in the essay "Language" in Poetry, Language, Thought. A hint of the theme occurs in "What is Metaphysics," which some of you read with John last quarter.

Third Meeting, Thursday, April 5

At the outset of the meeting questions were pertinently brought forth that called for some further consideration of subjectivity-objectivity as correlatively inflecting not only modern understanding of modes of being but the very experience and language of life itself in the modern epoch of the Western world. The thought of Descartes momentously participates in this development at a point at least near to its manifest inception as a conceptual scheme. In his thought we can find the force of the Medieval distinction esse objective and esse subjective kaleidoscopically shifting. As I understand the Medieval distinction esse objective meant something like "being-as-entertained-in-though" and esse subjective meant something like "being-in-very-reality", the mode of being of the subjectum undergirding and founding all our efforts in behalf of genuine knowledge. In the modern distinction 'objectivity' becomes the human stance from which genuine knowledge is possible and 'the thing known' is projected in representational judgment in the cast of 'object' and 'targeted' as such in the reference of such judgment. As knowers, then, we become knowing subjects concerned with possible objects of knowledge in an asymmetrical relation: one would have to say – to the known. (This asymmetry tends to invade both perceptual experience, especially in observation, and the way in which perceptual experience "comes to" be understood.) The knowing relationship is asymmetrical in the sense that mutuality is not in being is lost upon it; things taken in the objective-mode as objects – become "devoiced" and the sense of their having power to address us becomes almost insensibly attenuated, if not lost, their possible claim upon our concern is forfeited to the interests, the desires, and the will in terms of which the knowing subject as a human being personally responds to objects over and beyond his coming to know about them. The 'motivation' of the human being, then, originates 'in' the human being under the impact of 'objects.' The way in which things touch our concern tends to become "a subjective affair," in the last analysis irrelevant to the truth concerning them. Our feelings with respect to things tend toward emotional reactions to them (as otherwise cognized) and correspondingly less integral with the ambiance of meaning in which responsible response can be realized and in which things might be disclosed, revealed, and come to mutual realization with us. Now when it comes to relationship with one another in which the strongest form of mutuality may obtain, namely that that of reciprocity in mutual acknowledgment of each other as responsible beings, to what extent and in what ways might we think to discern the correlativity – the dialectic, one might say, of objectivity and subjectivity to hold sway? A suggestion or two will have to suffice at this point, and I offer them tentatively – as hardly thought out with anything like relative adequacy, and more like scents that one might get the whiff of. For one thing I wonder if the rise of Individualism doesn't need to be understood in profound connection with the dialectic in question: the sense of living one's own personal life as province of one's one jurisdiction within what appears as an objective context indifferent if not even opposed to that life; a "context" in which 'society' emerges as much as an objective order as does nature. Marx's piece "On the Jewish Question" is searchingly pointed on this matter. See Karl Marx: Early Writings, Bottomore, McGraw-Hill, 1964, pp.24-26. Such a personal life tends to show itself in language and in action as 'self-expression,' as an expression of subjectivity, shared with one's intimates similarly engaged in language and in action, impinging on one another,

issuing and receiving vibrations and signals ('communication' seems to have become a central problematic in our current culture). The situation I am trying to indicate seems tellingly revealed in the almost epidemic proportion of close personal relationships which may come to intensity and rapport yet which seem to lack foundation upon which they endure and can suffer the shock of frustrations, emerging differences, subtle change attendant upon mutual becoming, without rendering of persons asunder. Then the relationship in retrospect would seem to culminate and end with recognition and acceptance of it as a fact that a growing apart has occurred – strangely enough, often, in that once such an outcome wouldn't have seemed possible from within such antecedently close relationship. In the aspect of a factum this is indeed baffling.

If the dialectic of subjectivity and objectivity has something to do with the way experience takes shape – in which we are 'bathed' as it were, in our Modern epoch, then I doubt if we can simply fall back to understand what is at issue on the analysis of attachment trenchantly advanced, say, in the Gita or in Augustine's Confessions; however helpful they may be.

Mike Howell asked for elucidation of the sense in which 'the subject' existing in correlativity with an 'objective order' would necessarily suffer, in the end, the dominance of that order (Essay I, p.5). What I had in mind was that with the inevitability of death the objective order would seem to hold in reserve the last word, the trump card in the interplay of the life of the subject with that order. And time 'itself' would tend to assume the character of an implacable objective force bound to prevail over us in the end. Life furthermore would be profoundly haunted with the sense of our time surely 'running out.' Heidegger's On Time and Being and "What Are Poets For" in Poetry, Language, Thought should set up on our way in inquiring further into this matter.

Jim Hatley observed at this point that an objective approach to human beings, as he thought to see such a tendency in 'behavior modification' tends to do violence to "their subjectivity," as I believe he put it. Why couldn't one put this thought in softer focus and say that it may tend to do violence to the human being involved and perhaps not just to those subjected to such an approach as that? I hope I have suggested reason for not conceding the lives of persons to a subjective mode of being even though out lives may in considerable measure actually come to be subjectivized.

One thing seems clear: prevalent thought seems unquestioningly suffused with the subjective-objective correlation. The language in terms of which we think is replete with this character. It tends to settle in explicit terms questions as to who and 'what' we are and what we can make of the world. Now as Marcel will be found pointing out, the conceptions we are able to form of ourselves and those which we receive as prevalently promulgated tend to interlock. Ways of thinking and theories about being human tend to invade our being human, as it were, and to lock us and our experience within confines which they thus may tend to reinforce. One can understand that Marcel could come to say in the midst of writing a book concerned with this point (in English: Man Against Humanity, London, Hawill Press, 1952, p. 188) "Coming home the other evening from an excellent Bach concert; I thought to myself, 'Here is something that restores to one a

feeling that one might have thought lost, or perhaps something more than a feeling, an assurance: the assurance that it is an honour to be a man." (Let mention that by 'man' he does not mean here 'an adult make human being, as distinguished from a female' but rather 'any human being, regardless of sex….')

In our sixth essay, on page 7, there is quotation from Marcel (translation on p. 17); he puts his finger precisely on the basic reflective issue underlying our discussion of objectivity/subjectivity: it is a matter of "perceiving" (i.e., of coming to understand) the co-articulation of life and truth. (Monsieur Marcel accepted the rendering of the French 'articulation' by the stronger English 'co-articulation'). The issue is cognate with that of interpreting truth in the mode of liberating truth. Such a theme -- requiring meditation and interpretation, I believe – is explicit and fundamental in the New Testament (see John, 8:31-32; I think Paul, Romans, 8:21 should also be considered in this connection). Spinoza's thought seems ultimately concerned with liberating truth. And in both the Hindu and Buddhist traditions human enlightenment and human freedom are construed as absolutely integral. The issue posed by these cognate thematic loci is indeed a radical one. It takes hold of one 'from the root.' The force of this expression will always be of increasing concern to me to try to clarify as we proceed with the essays. I take it to be germane to the interpretation, for instance, of what Augustine arrives at in his reflection on friendship in Book IV of the Confessions when he says, "If bodies please thee, praise God on occasion of them, and turn back thy love upon their Maker. . .If souls please thee be they loved in God; for they too are unstable, but in skin they are firmly established…" (XII, 18, underlining added). Note too the same phrasing in John 3:21, "But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God." (underlining added). In yet another instance, quoted in our meeting, we find Meister Eckhart saying, "But in God all humanity is known to the soul, and all things else, in their highest [reality], for in him they are known as beings." (Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, R.B. Blakney, Harper & Bros. 1941, p. 131. All subsequent references to pages in this volume, which is of the same pagination in the paperback edition.)

Let me set down at this point the other questions from Eckhart which I read to you. They were by way of amplifying a bit the background from his thought which I had very much in mind at the time of writing the third essay – on creation.

"To my outer man, creatures taste like creatures, as do wine, bread, and meat. To my inner man, they taste like gifts of God rather than creatures, and to my inmost being, they are not like gifts of God but like forever and evermore!" (225)

"God did not make heaven and earth as our time-bound speech describes creation; they came into being when He spoke the word out of eternity. " (86)

"The genuine word of eternity is spoken only in that eternity of the man who is himself a wilderness…" (120)

"It is in the stillness, in the silence, that the word of God is to be heard…" (107)

"Creatures have no Being of their own, for their Being is the presence of God." (185)

"For where God is, being is, and it is the stronghold of his habitation." "God is in his temple in intelligence." (220)

"…for what we plant in the soul of contemplation we shall reap in the harvest of action and thus the purpose of contemplation is achieved." (111)

"God shelters the soul's nothingness with his uncreated essence, safeguarding its creaturely existence. The soul has dared to become nothing, and cannot pass from its own being into nothingness and then back again, losing its own identity in the process, except God safeguarded it. This must needs be so." (159)

We began our direct approach to the second essay with the opening theme to the effect that myth of creation – and I had in mind specifically Genesis I – bespeaks creation – does not speak about it; it participates that of which, from which, it speaks forth in acknowledgement of it. That acknowledging--speaking in the mythical utterance is called forth, worked, articulated upon what is thematic in and for it.

The remainder of our discussion dwelt meditatively on God's power as presencing in and with the mode of being of the beings in the world – their (and our) creaturely being. In this mode of being creatures bear witness to that power and they register for us with evocative power: they thus come to claim our concern. The creative power is reckoned with in the myth as a primordial speaking with which the creatures <u>are</u> as called forth with a power on their part to speak to us, address us and summon us into a responsive speaking; which presupposes a hearing on our part as necessary in our coming to acknowledge them in their creaturely mode of being and the creative power to which they attest in their speaking. May it be that stillness, silence, may come to be pregnant-charged-with the potential of address response in which we may find ourselves coming to birth acknowledgingly as in and of creation? Then perhaps we could say that stillness itself voices us for a hearing and the speaking which can address us, and the responsive speaking of which we may become capable. (cf. the possible rendering of I Kings 19:12 on God's addressing Elijah as "a voice of stillness." This voice puts Elijah in question: "what doest thou hear, Elijah? – verse 13. And with that a destinate future begins to come to him again.

At any rate, we moved to concentrate on getting a phenomenological lead into the power of creatures to address us, and at the same time with due recognition that we often in candor must acknowledge that they seem to us quite devoid of that power. We have noted in a preliminary way how this goes with Vincent. The story of the experience of the Harvard mountaineer is suggestive to the same effect: namely, that creation may be lost upon us – creatures do not as such seem to fall within the purview of demonstrable knowledge; and by the same token, insofar as one tries to get a hold on them, creation gets subverted and its gifts evanesce. How elusive the very matters we are discussing can be! How can a world that can be so full of meaning become as vacuous as it may so

often seem to do? The essay on love (V) works within the ambience of such a questioning.

If 'the speaking-hearing' character of participation in creation can only register for us insofar as we become susceptible to, open for, receptively responsive to, evocation, which we do not and cannot originate, then it seems to follow that any genuine 'knowing of creation' must necessarily be in the mode of acknowledging. In Old Testament language creation could only be 'known' as such to the covenanted heart, and thus affirmed and confirmed. It would therefore strictly confound conversion into a matter for demonstrable assertions. No doubt there might be 'all-at-once' times which could become decisive for faith in the 'creational character' of reality, but the steadfastness implied in faith would also seem to imply constant trial and a long, cumulative, and also doubt-beset way in which we would persevere consentingly. The whole range of our human sensibility would be caught up in it. If we are to take such a way upon ourselves reflectively, I think we must be alert for the intimations which can nourish our reflection and dilate our capacity for surmise. Such intimations tend to multiply and mount with heeding and to gather in cumulative coherency, thus tending to compose a way in thought in intimacy and interplay with the whole of lived life. The surprise of genuine discovery seems to attend upon those heeded intimations which may come to us and give us food for thought. They are received in gratitude. And in this vein Heidegger's observations on the kinship of denken and danken – thinking and thanking, come within the pale of intelligibility; it is no facile play on words. (I am reminded in this connection of Augustine's definition of the vita beata – which I would translate, interpret, as the blessed rather than the happy life. In Book X of the Confessions the culminating definition of such a life is "joy in the Truth.")

Another recurrent theme of Heidegger's is that of the essential neighborliness of thinking and poetry. (See at this juncture the poem in German: Auf der Erfahrung des Denkens, literally – from, out of the experience – or wending of the way – of thought, of thinking.) The intimations of creation of concern to us in thought which we touched upon at the close of our meeting were of the order of engaging our sensibility in the mode of the beautiful and also, to speak strictly, in the mode of the sublime. Attentiveness to the way in which not only poetry and the range of the arts but also the beings of the world may address us in this vein – and may also fail to do so – seems essential to our way of thought. The story of the experience of the young mountaineer taken up into acknowledgement in his thought fell into place in this connection. Psalm 148 could have been heeded in this connection, or the Voice from the Whirlwind or Genesis 1, when we touched upon the modality of grace but for which creation would tend to be lost upon us. (Essay V, pages 12-19 speak to this line of thought rather pointedly.)

Finally I should mention two stories that had their place in the course of our meeting this day. Both of them hearkened back to previous discussion of criteria of judgment and of decision. (1) When Hocking pressed the man who was tending the drilling operation in the oilfield as to how he knew when to stop the drive engine if the drill point were to hang up, in time to prevent the snapping of the shaft, his answer could only be: "Eighteen years' experience." Reminiscent of Wittgenstein's observation, adduced by Paul Tanaka,

that there are times when the demand for a giving of reasons as warrant for an action, a judgment, may become irrelevant, and most importantly so where continuing to demand vindicating considerations would be to evade or at least miss the authority with which the judgment or action has become able to speak and to which it bears witness. (2) The story concerning the convict at a decisive juncture in Faulkner's The Old Man (see Inward Morning, entry of July 27, pages 116-119.) And note the way his spoken decision is heard by those who had a moment before been contending with him and had not been convinced by his immediately preceding and heated insistence. The finality of the genuine decision, by contrast, is all the more unmistakably differentiated and pronounced; in its very tonality, it carries within it that which carries it with warrant. Its reasonableness does not reduce to a giving, of reasons; even where extension into patient reasoning may be reasonable as on Socrates' part with Crito in the Crito after Socrates has himself become decided (not 'made his decision')

Philosophy 460: Fourth and Fifth Meetings, April 10 & 12

At the opening of the Tuesday meeting Mike Howell spoke of a Hopi myth of creation apart from which anthropologists digging in the central pit in a Hopi village could not grasp the significance of the pit or of the things they were finding there. Of central interest in the myth itself, it seemed to me, was the theme of the echoing of the song of creation in the hearts of the people as essential for the completion of creation. And with 'forgetfulness' of this song correspondingly the face of the earth becomes flooded; there is a lapse of creation into oblivion, as it were. But a saving remnant of the people, still carrying the song in their hearts, are conserved in the central pit, and in the form of ants, beneath the inundation. With these emerging again in their full humanity, and correspondingly, with the subsiding of the covering flood, creation springs forth anew; but we recall that in this myth the primordial divine singing forth of creation required for its completion the resonating with it and answering response of the hearing heart.

We had been thinking of song toward the end of our previous meeting, and of Odysseus' exclamation to Alkinoos upon the singing of Demodokos at the opening of Bk. IX of the Odyssey: "How beautiful this is, to hear a minstrel gifted as yours: a god he might be singing! . . . .Here is the flower of life, it seems to me!" We had also thought Odysseus' speech to Amphinomos in Book XVIII "Of mortal creatures, all that breathe and move, earth bears none frailer than mankind. . . Our minds are as the days are, dark or bright, blown over by the father of gods and men. . .No man should flout the law, but keep in peace what gifts the gods may give." The speech as a whole clearly suggests that the frailty meant by Odysseus is not merely one of degree, but is of such degree by reason of its peculiarity – consisting of our susceptibility to the illusion of a possession of strength. While thus pondering our frailty we were suddenly visited by an invasion of fragile butterflies: Revelers of Dionysus.

Nest in our discussion David Strong asked about the sense of the sentence on II 10: "What is really necessary is what really comes to pass." Perhaps we should begin -- as we did – by focusing with emphasis on the second 'really': To appreciate in the sense or senses appropriate to what comes to pass would be to participate wittingly in realization,

in reality as realized in very truth. I think Rilke hints at the matter in saying to Mr. Kappus: "Do not be bewildered by the surfaces; in the depths all becomes law." (Letters to a Young Poet, Norton, 1954, p.38). This seems to have to do with our own responding. The last paragraph of the notes from our first meeting may call to mind some previous discussion of this. There we touched on the necessity as pertaining to decisive human response, as in coming to the realization of what must be spoken or done, and also as pertaining to the way in which things might come to make fundamental sense in the realization of a destinate existence. Readers of Inward Morning will recognize that necessity in these companionate respects is embraced in the theme of "finality" in that writing.)

A further implication of the theme of necessity was given explicit consideration in both meetings: That there seems to be a lawfulness obtaining between meaning and response, a kind of logic in which they are bound up; one might call it a karmic logic, or lawfulness (see Essay IV, p.6). "As we take things, so we have them; and if we take them in faith, we have them in earnest; if wishfully – then fantastically; if willfully, then stubbornly; if merely objectively, with the trimmings of subjectivity – then emptily; and it in faith, though it be in suffering, yet we have them in earnest, and it is really them that we have." (IV, 7). If we can construe in some such fashion Paul's "Be not deceived: God is not mocked, for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Galatians 6:7), then it should be noted that the logic of this matter would defy exploitation (i.e., the attempt to exploit it would be subverted by the very logic it attempted to exploit. One cannot gain control over the way in which things will come to mean for one. Much of Rilke's advice to Kappus seems by way of encouraging him to entrust himself in that way and not to be thrown by the inscrutability of what may be happening with him and of what it may come to, difficult though that can be to bear.)

The theme touched upon in Essay IV, p. 6 also crops up in II as one gets into pages 6 and 7. Note the sentence at the bottom of page 6: "Care awakens to itself as somehow responsible for its way of taking things and may well be imbued with suspicion that as it takes things, so it has them, yet precisely not in the sense that it can at will confer on things the fundamental aspect which they assume for it." It is then suggested that dramatic literature, in tragedy and comedy, is woven of karmic logic in its dialectical ironies. I would add, however, that if the Divine Comedy begins with the hopeless condition of souls who have sown and continue to sow fate, for whom necessity has finally assumed the character of a merciless punishment extraneously imposed on them, Dante proceeds to open up the dialectic of response and meaning into the possible reaches of mounting human freedom until in the Paradiso a fullness of appreciation comes upon the soul that indeed care and being are promised to one another in faithful life. With that the sense of blessedness may carry one through and beyond that version of karmic logic which would cling to a merit system of rewards and punishment such as we have heard from Job's friends – such as in parables of Jesus is shown to be inimical to participation in veritable life (i.e., "the kingdom of heaven").

In addition to our discussion of the sense in which it might be said that "being and care are 'promised' to one another" (II, 7) and of the "possibility of constancy in the course of

what phenomenal existence may bring" (IV, 2) – faithfulness, that is – we brought some critical reflection to bear on certain passages in the second essay, particularly where it is said "that we are able to be (as the creatures we are) in the image of being, which is no thing at all." At best I think this is obfuscating, but more than that I think it quite distorts the question as to the sense in which we may be "in the image of" as that is classically thematic in Genesis I. Suppose we grant Heidegger's distinction to the effect that the mode of being of beings cannot be rendered as a being or as reducible to beings; and that would apply, too, to our mode of being, an acknowledging participation in the being of beings, in which we share with them. Then we could not intelligibly be said to be in the image of the mode of being in which we thus share with them; we could only be in the image of that on the strength of which the mode of being in which we thus may come to share is possible: the theme is that of divine origin. If that theme were nugatory, effaced, simply wiped out, then 'in the image of' in this context would be gratuitous, idle speech; devoid of sense. It could bespeak no acknowledgement as to the way in which we might be in so far as we awaken into acknowledgment of our own derivative mode of being and become in the image of…as bearing witness to/// the creative power" that in which, and from which, our humanity is ultimately rooted.

If that power is a speaking power, exerted in a speaking presencing, when and how might we ascertain the manner of its 'voicing' relative to our hearing and potential for acknowledging speech? IN the very heart of stillness, may it be, that we come to know ourselves as thus addressed and claimed? Not a vacuous silence, but a stillness that hushes us in nearness to the well-spring, it seems the very word 'being' seems to come to Eckhart as charged with an ultimate resonance, in which God registers for him, as he puts it, "more as an 'is-ness' (Istichkeit), as God really is." (See Essay II, p.9). IS this consonant, say, with Isaiah 52:6, "…I am he that doth speak: behold it is I."? In our tradition of human language, 'being' and 'to be' are of Greek derivation. Can the speaking-presencing of God and creatures of the Old Testament tradition, indeed the sense of the living God, inform our ontological utterance? Notice the word 'behold' in the rendering in Isaiah 52:6: As I have learned from John Lawry "Hinneh!" The force of that Hebrew expression is that of an address, a calling upon a hearer, whose readiness in response is acknowledged in the answering Hebrew expression "Hinneni!" Notice how the response of readiness to receive resonates with – 'echos' – the word of address. Here it is an acknowledging –knowing that is indicated, which cannot be reduced to a seeing-knowing of a-being-in-advance, which 'behold' might literally suggest. Is ontological language so beholden to, saturated with a seeing-knowing, that it would tend to place us at variance with the language in which acknowledgement of creation would need to be realized? I think I am trying to develop a questioning here that is appropriate to thoughtful study now only of Eckhart, but also of Augustine, of the New Testament, of the issue hidden away in Spinoza, (is he Benedictus of Baruch, essentially?), and on into our won time, for the study of Marcel and of Heidegger. I see my writings, too, as struggling to work out the idiom appropriate within this destinate and questionable matter inherited within the very language in which we think and speak and try to understand as that matter may stand with us now.

And I wonder if the very reticence to speak in which I found myself in the occasion reflected in Essay III might not have been held in the grip of it. The key passage in that 'essay,' as I thought to call it to your especial attention, is the brief passage of January 1963 on page 4, in which profound stillness seems to preside and receive acknowledgment, even from things visible. Note the echo of this passage in the closing words of Essay IV, "on the sublime." The last two paragraphs of Essay V seem to mark a juncture in my thought from which I could go on, the consolidation of an advance upon the preceding essays. These paragraphs clearly open a way into the reflections in Essays VI and VII, undertaken in company with Monsieur Marcel. . . .and beyond' in his phrase, 'an dela,' by which he so often meant to signify a future coming to one in which one might more decisively find oneself - 'en situation.' In the surmise of his venturesome spirit I know too he was inclines to think of the situation-and-the-finding as that to which death might bring one. He always left me wondering, however, as to just how he might have meant that.

In the second of the meetings touch on in this set of notes the question arose as to the sense of 'constancy' in the "the possibility of constancy" spoken of on the second page of the fourth essay. This led to a discussion of faith in the sense of fidelity, of steadfastness- rather than in the sense of adherence to a doctrine as often suggested in speaking of "a faith." Tillick's Dynamics of Faith could be helpful in amplifying on the distinction. We considered Job's steadfastness through adversity, even in the undergoing of dire affliction, and even in the resoluteness with which he speaks forth the bitterness of his heart, as well as in the affirmations of trust which suddenly come forth as a rallying in the midst of his plaint. We thought to notice how integral fidelity is in him with his taking upon himself fully, and reasoning his doubts, his quandary, his not being able to understand, the very anguish that has come into his life. One sees this too in the firmness of his conviction that it is drastically wrong on the part of his friends to argue speciously for God in their attempt to get him simply to accept as his due what has befallen him. Faith in Job is at furthest remove from such a response of 'blind faith' and unthinking acquiescence as they seek to impose on him. And if-as the Bhagavad-Gita suggests – "a man consists of the faith there is in him," then as in the case of doubt, partaking of tings that threaten 'to unman us' it would seem that the part of fidelity implies a central concern with the logic of the situation, not a blinking of it. As Rilke puts it to Kappus doubt "must become critical," "must become knowing." (Ninth Letter).

With Pat Burke's request that we have a fresh go at the theme of creation and its ramifications, it seemed to me that the moment had come to begin to enlist the help of Augustine in this regard. A major portion of the Thursday meeting went toward tracing that movement of his thought in the Confessions in which Romans 1:20 seems more and more to guide his reflection: "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." For Augustine, the prompting of this verse leads him to the culminating thought in the ninth and tenth paragraphs of Book X, where "the things that are made" register for him as the creatures, by whose power to address him they bear witness to God's creative power so that this power (strictly "invisible") comes to be understood by the speaking of the creatures which, as with one voice, proclaim their

derivation as creatures and praise. The voicing of the creatures is the fulfilling of God's speaking/creating.

Now whatever sense we might in time come to make of this way of reckoning with creation, it must be clear from the start that it could make no sense in abstraction from the 'epistemic' correlation of these 'speakings' with a hearing on our part by virtue of which we might come to participate for our part in creation. And in the tenth paragraph Augustine addresses the question as to how it can be that the creatures can be lost upon us, can fail to register for us for the creatures he takes them veritably to be; and the companion question as to what is presupposed on our part insofar as we do become able to hear them, so that their speaking as creatures is not lost upon us, and we thus come to understand the speaking power to which they bear witness. Pivotal to both questions is an inquiring (a meditative inquiring) of the creatures with respect to which they might be heard in their answering voice; but that inquiring can come to naught except by virtue of a capacity to judge of the creatures in their mode of appearing in consonance with "the truth within" and by virtue of which their voice can be received. And how is it that in this respect we may be incapacitated? We are incapacitated, he says, in so far as "by the love of the" (in a sense about which we need to be very careful) we are "made subject unto them." Augustine's reflections on his earlier like are strewn with suggestions as to that "love" which must here be meant. In the Fourth Book this matter is given crucial consideration. In particular our attention focused on the phrasing in a sentence in the fifteenth paragraph: "Out of all these (creaturely) things let my soul praise Thee, O God, Creator of all; let not my soul be riveted unto these things with the glue of love…" Implicit here is the distinction, difficult though it may be, yet clearly phrased elsewhere in Book IV, between loving creatures "in God" and loving creatures "instead of God." We have already touched on that distinction in Augustine's thought. It clearly ties in on the one hand with the meaning of 'attachment,' of 'being riveted unto thing with the glue of love;' and on the other hand with the theme of devotion in the mode of disinterested interest.

In Book X Augustine is led to inquire into the vita beata (this is usually translated as 'the happy life,' and there is enough of the Epicuean in Augustine to suggest that rendering; nevertheless I want to suggest that we be alert to the force of beata etymologically appropriate to 'the Beatitudes' – as set forth in Matthew 5:3-11 – which speak of blessedness, not happiness; what sense would it make to say 'happy are they that mourn,' for example). He talks of seeing such a life; I don't want to discuss that now, for it is to the way he comes to define such a life that I want to come, as this bears on the theme of 'the truth within' in paragraph 32 he says, "And this is the vita beata, to rejoice to Thee, of Thee, for Thee…" In paragraph 33, then, he says, "for a vita beata is joy in the truth: for this is a joying in Thee." He then inquires as to how it may stand with us with regard to our wanting the truth. While all would say they want the truth, and one can see how none would want to be without it, insofar as they might play implicitly take the truth as advantaging them, the question now arises (paragraph 34) "But why doth truth generate hatred…" His answer comes to this: Therefore do they hate the truth for that thing's sake, which they love instead of the truth. They love truth when she enlightens, they hate her when she reproves. For since they would not be deceived, and would deceive, they

love her, when she discovers herself unto them, and hate her, when she discovers them. Whence she shall so repay them, that they who would not be made manifest by her, she both against their will makes manifest, and herself becometh not manifest unto them."

At this point we can grasp how one might speak of the "co-articulation of life and truth" (in Marcel's phrase). And in the content of the antecedent reflections on Augustine it becomes clearer that by "the truth within," but for which we cannot mediate with judgment so as to hear the creatures and participate knowingly in creation, truth is meant as a power which can place us in question: it searches our hearts 'from within.' And that is the radical way in which we may come to find ourselves claimed. Insofar as we come willingly to know ourselves (reflexively) as thus claimed, coordinately with the rightful claim of creatures upon us, as acknowledging participation in creation might be deemed possible. At the same time, might it not be clearer that knowing of creation would necessarily be in the mode of an acknowledging and could hardly reduce to a knowing about?

It seemed an appropriate juncture in our work to begin to bring some of Augustine's thought into central focus in our discussion of the theme of creation. My hope in doing so has been that it would gather up much that is placed at issue in the first five essays and position us more favorably for dealing with what is yet to come in the course of the seminar.

Toward the close of the second of these two meetings we took up with respect, and I tried to suggest how significantly coordinate respect for fellow creatures and self-respect may be. Particularly the point was dwelt upon that self-respect, in its reflexive character, does not thus obtain in such a way as to compete in the concentrated attention in which other creatures come to claim us in the mode of our respective them. Page 5-11 of the fifth essay in particular begin to amplify on implications of this point.

Our sixth meeting (Tuesday, April 17) was devoted to a detailed discussion of precise inflections of meaning in the unfolding of Marcel's thought in the essay "On the Ontological Mystery," working back and forth between the translation available to us and the French text. I will not attempt to retrace our steps in our series of notes.

PHIL 460: 7th Meeting

It might be well to set down at the outset of these notes two passages from the second volume of Marcel's The Mystery of Being which were read and discussed in the course of our previous meeting on Marcel:

1) "we are . . .almost inevitably led to recognize that being – taken in the full force of the expression – can in no case be treated as given. But at the same time everything (already considered in the context of these Gifford Lectures) prepares us to understand that 'l'exigence' is not a mere desire or a vague aspiration. It is a matter of an interior impulsion coming from the depths and which can be interpreted just as well as an 'appel' (a call)." I would take it that the call in

question would require reflexive acknowledgement of our being thus claimed in our concern, thus called upon, and this as akin to our being 'sourced.' Clarification in this we might well suppose to be a life-long matter, and hence the allusion with which our meeting began to the image of certain 'men of old' in Chapter XV of the Book of Tao who are said to have been "murky, as a troubled scream" ("which of you can assume such murkiness, to become in the end still and clear?")

2) Referring to the translation of a rather crucial passage on page 14 of the essay "On the Ontological Mystery," Marcel says: "One finds here: 'being is or should be necessary," but I wrote in French: "Il faut qu'il y ait ou il faudrait qu'il y eut etre." The sense very different. This 'il faut' or 'il faudrait' (the force of the 'must' in these expressions) bears on 'l'exigence' which is in me. The word 'need' which my translator used rather falsifies the thought here, for it suggests 'le besoin' (French for 'need') rather than 'l'exigence.' What seems to be at issue here, then, is the manner in which we may come to participate in being with beings as ourselves called upon and the 'must' would be crucially a matter bearing on our response as called upon. That which would be necessary would be in the imperative mood, as devolving on us, in fulfilling what may be called for. The vein in which 'l'exigence ontologique' is to be understood is that of responsibility, not that of a merely <u>de facto</u> need which we might happen to harbor. Insofar as we become the 'locus,' 'the site' ("la sedge") of a decisive affirmation of being we become pledged and resolved upon the way in which we may participate in a world that can resist attenuation (in the words of Shakespeare) "to a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." What Marcel calls 'la fidelite creatrice' (creative fidelity) implies a steadfastness in the mode of commitment articulated upon the way in which we, at bottom, are claimed in 'disponibilite' (availability, receptivity). (Please consider carefully in this connection Essay VI from the paragraph beginning just above the middle of page 5 to the end of the paragraph at the middle of page 77). Let us recall at this point, in the language of the Old Testament, the issue is continually arising as to how the Israelites are prone again and again to default on this possibility: it is as a "stiff-necked people" and as wanting to be at ease in Zion that they appear prone to such estrangement. Again in Augustine the question becomes central, how is it that creation may be lost upon us? And we gave some thought to how it is in our time that we may find ourselves living in a world that is haunted with the temptation to radical despair, and where estrangement seems to nestle in such pervasive normalities of life and prevalent conceptions of human being that it becomes difficult to bring the phenomena to focus <u>as</u> phenomena of estrangement. In the essay, "On the Ontological Mystery," whereby we not merely "see" ourselves in terms of "a mere assemblage of functions" but virtually live ('normally') lives parceled out according to scheduled allocation of time to both 'vital' and 'social' functions in succession upon one another (and also in the tension of their liability to encroach on one another – as they compete for our allocation of time to them in the round of daily affairs?). We discussed this theme early in our meeting. It links up with the telling force of the expression "the purely natural" (page 13) in the way things get taken as a matter of course. The telling force of how health, the aged, and death are customarily regarded and treated form an integral part with the analysis sustained in the text. If it be true (as the text should read on page 15) that "l'exigege" ontologique can

only be silenced by an arbitrary dictatorial act which mutilates the life of spirit at its roots, "that" such an act is always possible" and "that we can well believe that we are carrying it out," can we really suppose that a clear awareness of such an act as such is implied? To what extent may it be that our minds have become virtually defenseless in the grip of "some ghastly misinterpretation of life" (cf. page 12) that insinuates itself as if by osmosis into our life and thought?

I think that M. Marcel's analysis of the confounding character of our lived world makes closer contact with what becomes recognizable as our part in it when it focuses on what he means by 'indisponibilite' in contrariety with 'disponibilite' (translated in our text as 'unavailability' and 'availability' respectively). And to this extension of his analysis also belong what he means by the "sclerosis," the "egocentric topography" and the "encumbrance with one's own self" trenchantly explicated in the text from the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 40 through the complete paragraph at the center of page 43. By way of amplification of his analysis of these phenomena you may find two essays of Marcel's of pointed interest: "The Ego and Its Relation to Others" in Homo Viator and Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having. These books have been placed on reserve.

Jim Maher broached the theme of ontological mystery for our discussion. Marcel 'defines' mystery in terms of "a problem that encroaches on its own data" (pages 19, 22). If I try to arrive at a suggestive dramatization to assist in understanding this rather abstract formula, I am prompted to contrast what it may be to take up with the sea as a spectacle from an unquestioned stance high and dry on the shore and how it is when one has waded belly deep into the advancing rush of breaking waves in counter-point with the undertow, and one feels one's stance shifting in the sands affording one's footing in the play of the currents presencing for one there as thus immersed in them. There is the feeling-reflexively-of-being-placed-in-question by the play and counter-play of the currents manifestly coming to one and hiddenly working on one from behind and beneath. Isn't that something of a wonder in which we find ourselves embraced, only intelligible as such and only from within it? My point is not to suggest that one could not be worked upon by the sea in wonderment with its presencing while standing on the beach, but to grasp in the precise image offered the uncanny sense of immersion in the play of currents and the immediate sense of its implication for one's own footing.

M. Marcel's thought cannot be encapsulated in a formulaic rendering of what he means by the mystery of being; it proceeds by way of a gathering of considerations which bear on explication of what he means: of considerations that need to be dwelt on carefully in their cumulative and coherent significance. Among these we note: (1) mystery as it pertains to our very embodied (incarnate) existence. If we talk of this as the indivisible unity of body and soul, he then says it "can be neither analyzed nor reconstituted out of precedent elements. . .it is the basis of data". . . available to me as such, and not itself a datum (page 19). (2) departing from customary ways of attempting to reflect on evil, Marcel draws us into recognition that "evil which is only stated or observed (as in thinking of evil as a problem is no longer evil which is suffered. . .In reality, I can only grasp it as evil in the measure in which it touches me, that is to say, in the measure in

which I am involved, as one is involved in a law suit." (page 19). I take it that the analogy of involvement in a law suit not only suggests the touching of one's concern as the mode of involvement but also the questionableness of one's own position as thus involved. (3) This consideration leads to recognition of "how the distinction between what is in me and what is only before me can break down. (The whole subsequent discussion of a significant encounter and of presence elaborates this point.) (4) "But it is in love that the obliteration of this frontier can best be seen." (20) And in this connection Marcel proceeds to suggest how inevitably "unreflected reflection" tends to dissolve love into a problematical character abstractly conceived, for example, in such terms as "the will to live, the will to power, the libido, etc." Now, "since the domain of the problematical is that of the objectively valid, it will be extremely difficult – if not impossible – to refute these interpretations without changing to a new ground." And the intimation of the 'ground' in question is that it would lead us into the ontological bearing of fidelity. (5) Reflection on significant encounter now leads afresh into appreciation of mystery as a "reality rooted" in such a way that it cannot be reckoned with by reduction to the order of what I can place before me in the aspect coordinate with posing and solving problems. (page 21). The point requires reflective development, however, by facing objections which are bound to arise from an exclusively problematic way of thinking (page22). (6) "…it is only by a way of liberation and detachment from experience that we can possibly rise to the level of the metaproblematical and of mystery." (Perhaps it should be added 'in reflection.') Such liberation and detachment are not by way of abstraction; they are thematic in and for recollection (le recueillement), now carefully explicated on pages 23 and 24, and culminating with the force of Paul's "you are not your own," the essence of an acknowledgment in recollection of our being as "claimed," and in this manner 'rooted' in reality. (23-24) (7) The question may be raised, "is not this reality an object of intuition?" In so far as the notion might be creditable in such a connection, Marcel says "the more an intuition is central and basic in the being whom it illuminates, the less is it capable of turning back and apprehending itself." (25) However the central paragraph on this page carefully identifies a point of view from which "to be told of an intuitive knowledge of being is like being invited to play on a soundless piano." (An observation worthy of Wittgenstein, I think.) (8) Pages 26-33 revolve around a discussion of hope and despair in French their defining contrariety is explicit in the words: espoir and desespoir, esperer and pesesperer, esperance and diseperance).

The subject of "technics" is raised in this connection and a dialectic is suggested between our age as tending on the one hand to a definitive reliance on technics (with an attendant promise of increasing control in the interest of serving our desires and protecting us against things we fear) – interlocked with the tendency to envisage reality as a complex of problems (30) – and on the other hand an increasingly oppressive if 'undeclared' sense of our inability to save ourselves. (31) Note in this connection the sentence at the end of the last complete paragraph on this page (also translated as the second quote from Essay VII, page 8). Then consider the sentences on pride at the bottom of page 32. Isn't the attempt "to draw one's strength solely from oneself" with its destructive implications, integral with an even desperate intensification of collective concern with means and methods which may be developed and placed at our disposal for enhancing our control –

or our sense of the possibility of control – over things? Now, that is the significant contrary of pride – as Marcel defined it? I think one has to acknowledge that humility is the theme requiring meditation at this point, difficult though it may be to redeem it from misconceptions. The story of the Woman of Canaan (Matthew 15:21-28), which we reviewed in our discussion, might put us to 'on location' for such a meditation, and we might also have considered, for example, in the full context of the Beatitudes (Matthew 5:3-12) what it might mean "to inherit" (rather than exploit and despoil?) the earth. I think the vein of reflection I am hinting at would lead us into recognition of the inseparability of humility, of faithfulness, and of hope as they logically knit together and bear on the phase of ontological thought we are not touching on in Marcel's essay: the phase concerned with hope in its ontological implications is on the beam: (i) in a phrasing which he himself approximates and already entering our previous discussions being and care are promised to one another: on the strengthening of the human spirit in humility, in fidelity – and, with respect to the future in particular – hope. (ii) Hope in the most profound sense is rendered possible in the way in which concern is rooted, by virtue of the radical way in which we are claimed in concern. I am uneasy, however, about his saying "rooted in being" (middle of page 33). And there were other things in his discussion of hope which I think made all of us even more than uneasy, as Jim Maher's questioning led us to reflect on them. (9) The inquiry into ontological mystery is now deployed into the notion of "creative fidelity" and faithfulness to that which has come to one in the mode of presence. For Marcel the theme has a central bearing on death and on how we may be led into appreciation of our relation with those who have died. (34-38) (10) And this leads into the discussion of disponibilite, (38-44), which I will not attempt to amplify on at this point in the notes, though we did work on it a little in our meeting. It becomes central, of course, in Essays VI and VII, to which we soon turn.

Two further brief notes for this meeting. (i) "I am convinced that it is in drama and through drama that metaphysical thought grasps and defines itself <u>in conreto</u>." (p.26). Recall the constant writing of plays and their interplay with his reflective writings (from 1914 through at least 1955 – 23 plays during this period); and that Marcel avidly attended the theatre (and was deeply involved with music over the years), while also working regularly as a drama critic for a ling time. The more you read of his reflective works, the more you find his style of thought integral with the working of a dramatic imagination in his constant endeavor to render philosophic reflection "concrete."

(ii) On pages 46 of the essay, "On the Ontological Mystery" he speaks of there being "in the depth of Nature . . . .a fundamental principle of inadequacy to itself which is, as it were, a restless anticipation of a different order." I suggested some reflection on Romans 8:18-22 in connection with this remark. What might a 'different order' be, and just how is 'the order of Nature.' As implied here, to be understood? And wherein 'the difference'?

<u>Philosophy 460: Eighth and Ninth Meetings, April 24 &26</u>

Before addressing these meetings directly some notes should be added apropos of April 19.

At the close of this session we listened to the following from Vincent: :Do you know what I think of pretty often? That if I do not succeed, all the same what I have worked at will be carried on; not directly, but one isn't alone in believing in things that are true. And what does it matter personally then? I feel so strongly that it is with people as it is with corn; if you are not sown in the earth to spring there, what does it matter? You are ground between the millstones to become bread. The different between happiness and unhappiness! Both are necessary and useful; and death or disappearance, they are so relative – and life the same. Even face to face with an illness that breaks me up and frightens me, that belief is unshaken." (page 452)

Perhaps one may not be entirely clear as to Vincent's meaning in the second clause of the next to the last sentence, but it is apparent that overall his words are cumulatively spoken in the vein of affirmation (and not of making assertions) out of resoluteness in the actual occasion which tests and authenticates them. And surely they attest and bespeak with one voice both faith and hope in such a way that we can discern how hope is grounded in faith and not in the probability of specific outcomes on which one might stake oneself and rely without delusion. Would it be too much to say that his faith, in turn, is founded on the coarticulation of life and truth brought to concrete realization, and that this enters him in a human community in the destinate way of keeping faith with one's fellows – until the generations? At any rate, I think I hear Vincent saying that what really happens really counts ("not a sparrow falls…?"); and that one can entrust oneself to life-and-death in that vein – and perhaps one should say – only in that vein. The appeal of Vincent's words is from disinterested interest to disinterested interest. Or, if we register the force of his suffering, is 'purity of heart' the more trenchant phrase? The words seem uncommonly fresh (i.e., not hackneyed or stale) and . . . chaste.

Implicit here (as often in Rilke's letters to Kappus too) is sensitivity for what I have alluded to as karmic logic, or – as divine justice. You will recall that Psalm 73 entered our discussion in connection with this theme. Few texts reveal more succinctly or faithfully and candidly what a desperate struggle it can be to understand rather than to misunderstand this theme. The psalmist explicitly recognizes the central implication that his own heart is placed in question by it, and that try as he might he could not purify his own heart not only of the resentment and vindictiveness he has felt over the wicked (even blithe in their false ways and 'getting away with murder'); but also and perhaps even more deeply he may be offended to the quick that the truth of this matter should so persistently elude him – as if God were utterly perverse and letting us down, as it were, not to make it unmistakably plain, and to all concerned. And who is not offended in his own sense of justice, we may add, if divine justice is thought to imply sanction for the suffering of the innocent? Could we help but feel a moral revulsion and revot at such a 'scheme' (as does Camus' Dr. Rieux, for example, in The Plague)?

The psalmist, at any rate, names the actual occasion of his finally coming to understanding and a genuine affirmation of divine justice: The occasion is simply that of his entering into "the sanctuary of God." (Psalm 73: 17). Then he can acknowledge God as 'the strength of his heart' even as he acknowledges how fallible 'his heartland his

flesh' are (Verse 26); and how foolish and ignorant he has been (Verse 22). The revelatory force of having come into the sanctuary of God is attested out of that actual occasion. And the sanctuary of God? However we might imagine that, it would seem that we would have to imagine it as having spoken as profoundly and decisively to the psalmist's condition, and to the condition of man, as the Voice from the Whirlwind of Job. Well, on the theme of divine justice there seems to be no room for blithe or pat assurance, or for a theoretical overview, as it were, in the lived world. It might be all one could do, given the opportunity, to from it from the bottom of one's heart and within a scrupulous exercise of one's intelligence, as concrete occasions may eventually provide warrant; warrant for such affirmations, then, as one may recall one has heard before; different from demonstrable assertions; yet by no means devoid of logic.

Our eighth and ninth sessions centered in the interplay of the sixth and seventh essays with Monsieur Marcel's thought. We began from Dave Strong's request for some discussion of the way in which we may be unconditionally claimed in our concern. Now if it becomes ultimately possible to speak of a twofold way in which we can come to be claimed in our concern the distinction implied could not be drawn at the expense of a separation enabling us to isolate for recognition the way in which we may be unconditionally claimed in out concern from the way in which our concerns might be thus conditionally qualified and trued. Also it must be remembered that any direct attempt to respond to David's request and to understand such a response may be vitiated – even utterly – by all that can be entered into a style of life which might render the theme alien not only to our thought but to our very sensibility. But with these provisos, the request is nonetheless not to be declined, given the task of thought in which we are immersed. In the sixth essay it is suggested that it is in and according to the way one is worked on in genuine solitude that the sense of being unconditionally claimed, of being thus called upon tends to be accentuated, intensified. Such solitude entails at once both a certain degagement and a certain disponibilite and also concentrated attentiveness (a l'ecoute) for the co-articulation of lived life and truth. The degagement in question is not an abandonment, an abdication of the manifold concerns which animate the activities and relationships of everyday life; it has to do rather with a suspension of their active pursuit under the dominance of intentions which we are bent upon, so that we become accessible for awareness of what remains inadvertent in our lives, in our responses, in so far as intention holds sway in them. In the suggestive thought of Louis Lavelle, to which I alluded, instead of intention ruling attention, one becomes intent in and upon an attending – as is the case with any deep concentration in music which can awaken, quicken and help us know ourselves at heart; and I mean music which has the power to evoke reverence and compassion and a sense of the inexhaustible well-spring of true life in myriad inflections. And as one may find one undergoes a long discipline with music if it is to come to that, so it is, very likely, with the way in which we are worked upon in genuine solitude – and a deeper discipline than any we can impose upon ourselves , one demanding rigor in meditation.

In the Old Testament is it not clear that the sense of existing before God entails the sense of being unconditionally claimed – called upon? Let us note three points that may be suggested in this connection:

1) The actual occasions in which God's 'presencing' comes home to the respondent seem to be occasions of solitude, as when Abraham is called upon in a way touching upon his concern for Isaac; as in Moses' being addressed from the burning bush and summoned alone up Mount Sinai; as in the dream that comes to Jacob, and in the call thrice coming upon the young Samuel in the night; as in the address received by Elijah at the mouth of the cave; as in the calling of Jeremiah and of Isaiah. As Kierkegaard might put it, this call comes as 'singling' the respondent out. The address is to the man at the heart of his sense of responsibility.

2) The way in which the respondent is thus radically called upon always touches on his responsibilities in the world and the way in which they need to be understood, so that he issues from solitude as one sent forth into the world prepared to acknowledge the legitimate call and claim upon his concern engendered in his active participation in the world. It is in the world and with the beings of the world that what may be called for has to be continually worked out. (That is the force of coesse).

3) I wish to risk an interpretation of the theme in the Old Testament that no man could see God and live – taking it apart from the sense in which God's power might break forth upon the Israelites assembled around the foot of Sinai to their destruction (cf. the incident of Uzzah with the Ark of the Covenant?). The sense I wish to suggest in which it might be intelligible to say that no man could see God and live presupposes that this is just not possible – 'to see God.' But were it possible then 'God' would no longer be God: namely, as the animating source of our lives (as Augustine puts it, "life of our lives"). Were it possible to convert our existing before God into 'God existing before us,' that would spell the human death of us. To speak in a figure of radical derivation, we come forth from the root, not toward the root.

What, then, when Job says (42: 5-6) "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear: but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes."? Has he literally 'seen God?' Is that the sense of the matter? How would that fit with the voicing of the creatures, brought forth as such in living speech in demand for his acknowledgement? Isn't it in such encounter with them as presencing in this way that he is at the same time brought from 'hearsay,' as it were, into discerning acknowledgement of God? God's presence is borne in upon him as never before with the force of the encounter, it would seen, even as now he abhors himself, and repents in dust and ashes before God. Is he abased then, "a worm" before God (in the word of Bildad? 25:6). NO, he is addressed as a man and sponsored in answering for himself. But what has been brought home to him has unutterably humbled him, even as he has been redeemed by it from despair.

A final comment or two while we are again on location here with The Book of Job: Job has been called into question for having tended to darken counsel by words without

knowledge (38:2). A question, then, prompted by very helpful thought in the journal of Doug Pierce: what place have the creatures themselves, what voice have they in 'counsel'? Surely the Voice from the Whirlwind commands a taking of them to heart in rightful heeding and concern for them. And the appalling implications of darkening counsel seem to be spelled out for Job in 40:2, 8-14; Job is made aware of that potential, that direction in which he was headed – all inadvertently, no doubt – in his having hidden counsel without knowledge' (42:3). In 42:2 Job has just said "I know… that no thought can be withholden from thee." Consciousness by no means presides over the life of the soul; yet one may become conscious that everything that goes on in the life of the soul – however inadvertently – counts. The way in which things come to mean for us and to concern us is thus surely composed.

The dramatic power of Freud's thought comes to focus I his inquiry into the logic of what inadvertently 'qualifies' our responses.

We took up another path toward reflective recognition of what it may mean to be unconditionally claimed – called upon – a path delineated in the New Testament. Jesus delineates this path: "And blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me." (Matthew 11:6). The portrait is writ large and replete with the dramatic episodes set forth in the four Gospels of how people come to be offended in him by virtue of their vested interests and by virtue of conditional concerns to which they have yielded themselves unconditionally. The parables search out the hearer's own proclivities in this regard.

We confined ourselves to a particular track , however, opening up from 'the hard sayings' in Matthew 10:34-36, Luke 12:51-53 and 14:26. "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance with his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against the mother-in-law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household." (The Matthew passage) Luke 14:26 is even more extreme: "if any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yes, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." Conceivably, one might listen to these words, shrug at them and walk off. So far forth they would hardly have set him on a path of reflection toward recognition. Yet surely they are pointedly charged with the power to offend and to put us on location to be worked upon by their thematic import. They invade the inner sanctum of our most intimate relations and make their declaration of tumult and turmoil. They have not missed their mark if one were to boil up at his. Their prophetic power to read one to oneself would already be at work. They might well – without granting us any option or asking our permission – simply throw us into what Ray Hart speaks of mnemonic shock. Subsequent occasions which they fit may bring them back upon one with mnemonic shock, for they are 'sleepers' and can bide their time. Then we may realize that they were not moralizing with us in perverse advocacy of hatred and violence. But be these possibilities as they may, let us assume we are not put out by these words and not to be put off by them, astringent though they are. And perhaps we may receive them even calmly as speaking in the idiom which Albert Borgmann calls that of 'pedagogical exasperation' and so as making a point to be

mediated upon. We are now on the threshold of a reflective path. And what were the initial exploratory steps we took? . . .a bare beginning.

The task: to understand what it may mean to be unconditionally claimed in on'es concern as likely to show up in a manner that may provoke offense and set us at variance in most intimate relations. How to proceed? On the hermeneutical principle that it would be well if we could to locate what is at issue in a concrete occasion, one that may dramatize the matter unmistakably. Where should we look for such an occasion? We looked to two 'little' incidents portrayed in the life of Jesus himself. I shall reverse the order in which they occurred to us for a reason that will become apparent with the third step to be added in these current notes.

Step 1: "While he yet talked to the people, behold, his mother and his brethren stood without, desiring to speak with him. Then one said unto him, Behold, Thy mother and they brethren stand without, desiring to speak with thee. But he answered and said unto him that told him, "Who is my mother? And who are my brethren?" And he stretched forth his hand toward his disciples, and said, "Behold my mother and my brethren! For whosoever shall so the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister and mother." We savored how this might sit with his mother and his brethren. (Matthew 12:46-50).

Step 2: Consider the following narrative:

40 And the child grew, and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom: and the grace of God was upon him.

41 Now his parents went to Jerusalem every year at the feast of the Passover.

42 And when he was twelve years old, they went up to Jerusalem after the custom of the feast.

43 And when they had fulfilled the days, as they returned, the child Jesus tarried behind in Jerusalem; and Joseph and his mother knew not of it.

44 But they, supposing him to have been in their company, went a day's journey; and they sought him among their kinsfolk and acquaintance.

45 And when they found him not, they turned back again to Jerusalem, seeking him.

46 And it came to pass, that after three days they found him in the temple, sitting in the midst of the doctors, both hearing them, and asking them questions.

47 And all that heard him were astonished at his understanding and answers.

48 And when they saw him, they were amazed: and his mother said unto him, "Son why hast thou dealt with us? Behold, thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing."

49 And he said unto them, "How is it that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I mist be about my Father's business?"

50 And they understood not the saying which he spake unto them. (Luke 2: 40-50)

We are told earlier in the text of Luke 2 of the prophetic things Mary had heard concerning her son during his infancy. "But Mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart." (Verse 19) Again (Verse 33): "And Joseph and his mother marveled at those things which were spoken of him." It would not seem inconsistent to imagine Mary's reproach to the child of twelve to be thus a temperate reproach. And his response to her in the strange circumstance in which they have recovered him, coming from a child of twelve…! Understandably, in Verse 50 we are not told that the parents were offended in him; only, "And they understood not the saying which he spake unto them." But now let us transpose response in the vein of Jesus' attestation of the ay he has found himself called upon to the case of one who might have come to follow him is like acknowledgement and consecration – one living in intimacy with a family whose expectations cannot be imagined to be as tempered and prepared as our narrative suggests in the case of Jesus' parents. Would it be difficult, then, to grasp the prophetic force of the Matthew passage (10: 34-36)? Ponder Luke 10: 38-42 in this connection.

And if one wants to understand how being unconditionally called upon might entail coming to hate one's own life – undergoing that – consider Alcibades' speech in the Symposium. Or consider the impact of Jesus on Zacchaeus (Luke 19: 1-10); or the upshot of Judas' story (Matthew 27: 3-5); or the prayer of the publican (see Luke 18: 10-13).

Step 3: Those of you for whom King Lear has sunk in and worked on you: Consider Cordelia's stand with Lear in the opening scene. Wherein is her love for her father trued, as it surely appears to be? Consider her words of acknowledgment to him of what he may rightly expect of her (Act 1, Scene I, lines 98-100), in which, she can assure him, she does not fail him. As to the offense Lear takes in her, surely nothing need be said: her, who has been dearest to him, he categorically disowns on the spot. Next, we note how the Fool is of the same fundamental derivation as Cordelia is. And Lear knows all too well where he is coming from. She, who personifies that folly for the worldly-wise which the Fool has embraced (see Act II, Scene iv, 66-84), is hanged (Act V, scene iii, 307: "And my poor fool is hanged…"). Finally, let us meditate on the words we hear from Cordelia's heart in IV, iv (24-25): "O dear father, it is thy business I go about." If they can be heard echoing Luke 2: 49 ("wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?"), do they not resonate concordance of the twofold way in which concern is claimed in full truth? Most harmonious and logical words.

I thought Donna Davis precipitated an excellent preliminary discussion in the meeting of this Tuesday, April 24, on the distinction and the relation between poetic and philosophic idiom. Our work in Heidegger will no doubt reopen and implement that discussion.

A final note on what transpired that day. I simply wish to underscore what I said by way of caution lest one let the distinction between l'exigence ontologique and desire, need, interest, inclination obscure the way in which the latter may be taken into l'exigence and so may both come to incarnate it and to be transfigured in the way we are called upon and respond. The paragraph in Essay VI beginning on page 7 and ending on the next page invites careful reflection on this matter. Consider the dialectic of willing and wanting touching on when we come to page 12.

And now: with respect to the meeting of Thursday, April 26, you will recall the whole meeting was absorbed in a spontaneous and concentrated reflection on 'the twofold way in which concern may be claimed.' One cannot reproduce anything like that here in these notes, and I have nothing to add now on what transpired.

Tenth and Eleventh Meetings, May 1 and 3

During the tenth meeting the ninth essay – on wilderness – was up for discussion. David Strong wanted some elucidation of the passage on the twelfth page of the essay touching on the way in which "we are ordained in responsible relationship with beings given into our keeping in the very presencing of the world. The mystery of this, it would seem, can only deepen, and with its deepening enhance the sense the world might make. But one is charged to make good on that sense…"

The essay is particularly concerned with "primordial placement" in the wilderness and our fundamental involvement in and with 'the things of Nature.' As Bryan Black once exclaimed when I was questioning him as to how it was up there when he had just returned from the upper reaches of the Sun River watershed, "that country makes a powerful statement!" One that sinks in and works on a person. Austere and awesome: the place. Jim Hatley aptly thought of the Salmon River canyon at one point as we were in the midst of this matter; where the River uncannily and categorically voices the place; no escaping it; a place wherein the soul is searched and one's embodied being becomes integral with profound solitude; the capacity for wonder is flexed and stretched to commensurability with the presencing of heaven-and-earth. As that capacity is the more powerfully summoned, imagination is the more staggered and the limits of comprehension is called into play and quickened, even as we grope questioningly in the grip of wonder; and the questioner in his very questioning comes to know himself as questioned – placed in question. The questionableness of our being in time as mortals seals us in. In wonder death is already touching us as laying down the law to the living. We are ineluctably plunged in mystery, and may only lapse from awareness of it. Life as lived is clearly differentiated from anything of the order of problems to which 'answers' can obtain. Not answers, but answering response within mystery and upon it can alone enact the mode of intelligibility from within it of which it admits, and that comes to pass

only as evoked. That is the way to acknowledgment of mystery as such. Mystery in this precise sense can only deepen; it cannot be dispelled. And in wonder we receive the annunciation of mystery in the very mood of surmise: of what we are in for. Thus wonder is not to be allayed, however we may lapse from it into obliviousness of its import – even into an inadvertent and spiritless existence – a 'world' of fixed identities to which change is superadded and relations are tacked on.

Returning to the theme of primordial placement, how may the deepening of wonder occur with the presencing of 'Nature'? Certainly herein anthropocentricity – let alone egocentricity – cannot hold good. As Kant puts it in his analysis of the sublime with respect to Nature, our purposes do not reign here. Now as he moves toward the culmination of his analysis (I'm dealing with what he calls 'the dynamic sublime – to which I believe 'the mathematical sublime' was preliminary) he says: "Simplicity is the style of Nature in the sublime." That preeminently is the style of Nature as wilderness. And the deepening of wonder according with it is into simplicity as the style of our lives. Thus the soul of man comes to answer in the vein in which wilderness is decisively given and therein our kinship with Nature comes to be made good, even as the threat of nature is – not blinked – but surpassed in the opening of ourselves to what is given. In such times the covenanting of the heart is renewed and we are sent forth on our way in the world anew, tried for participation in fulfillment of the way in which we are addressed, to become governed and disciplined in that way, to carry wilderness in our hearts into the walks of life, to the tempering of use in discrimination from abuse; without reverence and respect in such discrimination possible?

At this point we called to mind another facet of Indian tradition than that of consecration in wilderness solitude touched upon in the essay; the sacramental character of the hunt and the sacredness of the land. Joseph Epes Brown gave a memorial portrayal of the former in immediate conjunction with my presentation of the wilderness essay on May 4, 1974 (see Prefatory Note to the essay). And the great speech of Chief Seattle underlay what was said concerning the sacredness of the land. The more profound and intensive and central the sense of sacred bonds into which a people are given – both in relation with things and with one another – the more shockingly sacrilegious obliviousness and violation with respect to the meaning of coesse becomes for them.

Yet how readily and authentically can we come to think, to speak, to know acknowledging, in such language as this? Does out form of life nurture such language and reflect itself therein? Or, does our accustomed speech at least as much unobtrusively govern in our form of life?

With respect to 'form of life' we were led into a host of considerations which we barely began to explore: what ownership, 'having,' and personal property may mean to us; our everyday relationship (mediated by money) as 'titular' consumers with things for use which present themselves to us as marketed (and advertised) 'commodities' our everyday involvement with technological means and devices* which tend to diminish our having a real hand in things and maximize our investment in instant availability* (*These expressions are central in Albert Borgmann's incisive hermeneutical analyses of

technology. Acknowledgement of a special indebtedness to Albert is certainly due here) and the more effortless exercise of controlling power over services to be rendered us; (with our consequent vulnerability to impatience) the tendency to subsume our lives, our undertakings, to administrative jurisdiction our very personal resources, and disposition under the aegis of attaining our posited 'goals'; The relative perfunctoriness or superficiality at least, of so many of the relationships woven into the texture of the life in the midst of which we move.

Such a welter of considerations same teeming forth in this entrée into the discussion of contemporary form of life! All requiring more careful and discriminating exploration in their complexities and dialectical connections that we were capable of in such brief compass. An occasion of exploration, at any rate. Memorable to me from the course of it were the reflection on the life and ritual of the monks of the Benedictins Abbey of St. John's in Minnesota, and then our musing on current concern with the growth and preparation of food – fads and exploitation of that concern apart. Readers of The Inward Morning may recall in particular the inquiry sustained with regard to life at sea (pages 176-193) as to how that routinized everyday existence under trying circumstances might have lent itself to transmutation and, yes, transfiguration, through discipline – so that genuine ritual could be understood to have transpired in the course of it. I think this inquiry would complement the discussion of ritual in which we engaged. Consider too a little passage earlier in the book, pages 71-72, on Christmas in the wilderness. It begins, "for a moment just now I could remember…"

As we moved to the discussion of the language situation integral with the form of life, I think I can discern in it a progression by which the discussion moved: (1) a prelude to it, (2) a prefatory consideration, and a bridging study in the integral involvement of language in and with form of life.

(1) The prelude: a listening to these texts: . . ."for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth evil things. But I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment. For by the words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." (Matthew 12: 34-37). And "not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man." (Matthew 15:11).

(2) These passages were not brought up to invite a vein of censoriousness or of indictment, but to suggest the very centrality of speech in form of life. For us they may suggest ours as an hermeneutic task, that of interpreting 'the language situation' for the sake of understanding – in contradiction from either moralizing about it or coming at it as diagnosticians looking for 'causes' of what may be amiss with a view to instituting a controlling power 'over' the situation toward remedying it.

(3) It was from Flaubert's Madame Bovary (1857) that the bridging step came to mind, though we hardly took it far or hardly noticed how far it might take us were

> we to study this entire work with care. For the work, like that of Rabelais, in the fruition of an unflagging listening to manners of speech with a most acute hearing, and it effects a masterpiece in the study of the unmediated centrality of what is happening in speech in and for the while form of life. I say 'unmediated' (as Wittgenstein suggests) for in speech form of life is directly reflected and inflected, in a way that is not mediated by reasoned reflection or by deliberately instituted and reasoned options intervening between language as it comes into play and form of life. Hence much of the inadvertency, the 'not-noticing,' creeping into our involvement in both. Style of life goes deeper than any possible adoption of 'life-styles' and haunts that sort of ploy, a point suggested in the little essay on education (#VIII in our collection).

At any rate, a particulate passage from Madame Bovary came to mind: "Charles's conversation was commonplace as a street pavement and everyone's ideas trooped though it in their everyday garb, without exciting emotion, laughter, or thought" (Norton Edition, p.29). The banalization of speech: the drabness of existence for possible sharing. The attenuation and calcification of meaning, its attrition in commonplace parlance, throughout packaging in cliché and stereotype; speech habituated in a myriad of ways passing muster on accustomed occasion and within the normalized expectations of accustomed hearing: the whole received 'world' almost ready-made for utterance, platitudinous commentary, the saying of what 'one says' on the occasion as if virtually programmed for 'talk' (Heidegger's Rede in Being and Time); then the alternation between speaking and hearing as an information-transaction and the language of 'self-expression' in which one locked up soul more or less bursts forth, crying out for its kindred in another, in passing. And then indeed at the creses of life it may seem, "The human tongue is like a cracked cauldron on which we beat out tunes to set or bear dancing when we would make the stars weep with our melodies." (Madame Bovary, pl. 138).

We really did not get beyond such a sketching in gestural language of the promptings of Flaubert: in this case bearing on the significance of speech in a bourgeois world. Then we went on to attend briefly to how powerful and pregnant the simplest speech can be as integral with culminatory occasions of life.

The eleventh meeting developed in two main parts, as a discussion of security/insecurity and of passion, respectively. Andy Scott introduced the discussion of both from points of departure in the tenth essay of our collection.

We began from a sentence on the fifth page of this essay: "Security and insecurity are simply not the modes of consummation or of default in relationship found to be decisively dialogic." Even pondered in context, the sentence seems to call for elucidation, or at the least for amplification, and I'm not sure we satisfied this need, though our reflection on the meaning of security/insecurity and of manifold ways in which we may invest in security might have become relevant to the task. At any rate, Andy started us off with a commentary on the Hoarders and Waster in Dante's Inferno: the Hoarders are invested in holding on to their means as avidly – as compulsively and

with as much concupiscence – as the Wasters are similarly driven into expending their means in securing/procuring. Both appear to be insatiable, driven by a craving which mounts with attainment. With some help from Marx' analysis of the dialectic of the getting and the spending of means in the form of money we could appreciate the irony by which these souls are wedded to one another in rage at each other; both tarred 'with the same dilemma': Each makes manifest to the other the power he is losing according to his mode of having. The hoarder preserves the maximum of potential power over possibility by abstention from spending his hoard – at the loss of its serving as means for procuring anything actual from among these possibilities; while the waster loses that maximum command of possibility with each frenetic procurement of a particular possibility in actuality. How could they fail to hold each other in contempt from the opposing extremes of the same logical dilemma in which they are caught? Both have become maddened by "'having." Have they invested themselves in power as 'power over'…? It is such an investment that Marx explores so acutely (and scridly) in his analysis of "The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society." (See Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Struick – on reserve).

As between reasonable and prudent concern and provision for the future and getting hooked on the exercise of power as 'power over,' in which we in we invest ourselves as 'havers,' there seems to be a considerable range of meaning harbored in 'security.' The former need not undermine our essentially dialogic mode of being. I think; indeed it may be entailed within it, as in trying to make provision for being we love. Yet the range of our anxieties harbors all the ambiguity and ambivalence of our mode of involvement with power. Perhaps a key question is that of whether our disposition of resources which we may take to be at our disposal is at the expense of our being 'disponible', of our participation in and with. As with Odysseus (and Marcel), the question is: whence is one's strength – or, what is given unto one and how received into one's becoming able? This question is linked with a further question as to the sense in which we count as human beings; is our standing self-made, as it were, or is it shared – in and thus derived? If self-made then it takes on the character of status which is sought, as when Lear seeks to maintain for himself his royal prerogatives upon divesting himself of the responsibilities and cares of sovereignty; while one might think to discern genuine standing on the part of Cordelia in her steadfast love, devoid as she is of concern for status.

Marcel's essays, "The Ego and Its Relation with Others (in Homo Viator – on reserve) taken in conjunction with "Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having" (in Being and Having – also on reserve) should be of major assistance in recovering and developing the lines of thought we were thus pursuing during the first part of the session. Matthew 6:24-34 ("Take therefore no thought for the morrow") puts the question of security to us hard, once again in an extreme statement, the point of which requires that it be taken to heart and mediated on – heeded in this fashion, and not as if it were the statement of a policy to be adopted (by which one might be rendered secure!).

Etymologically 'security' means 'without care'. We will find the expression in this literal sense coming into play in Heidegger's essay "What are Poets for…?" And there the pivotal issue arises in terms of how as human beings we are most deeply and

peculiarly endangered, for it would be in respect to that danger that a possible resolution of the predicament of care would have to be understood.

"Teach us to care and not to care,
Teach us to sit still."

With these words of T.S. Eliot we ended this phase of our discussion, on security.

Yet, of course, in taking up with passion as our theme in the second phase of our discussion we hardly abandoned the subject of 'care'. Page eight of the tenth essay provided our point of departure, with the notion that passion might be construed as the incarnation of care, as embodiment of vitality and concern. Perhaps the point that was most central to suggest here lies in these sentences: "Passion clarified and sustained comes to know itself as evoked, at once reflexively derived and embodied in the world. So far forth our very desires seem to assume a warranted character, charged with vitality and meaning in interplay with a world speaking to them." That passion and desire can partake of human bondage has been so often dwelt upon, that they can, in Marx' phrase, seem inherently of an "egotistical nature" (Struick volume, p.139); and in the course of the development of Christian tradition they take on such a strong taint of concupiscence; and furthermore in more recent psychological theory they have come to be treated simply in de facto terms as motivational factors: All this I wished to get beyond here, and to suggest that in essence clarification and emancipation with respect to desire and passion come to pass in the vocative mode and partake of the character of responsible response; even to the point of informing the whole of bodily life with a sacramental character. Perhaps the actual occasions which make that intelligible to us in any pronounced fashion may be rare. Yet the sense of the matter may also come to dwell deep in the heart, underlying what surfaces in consciousness or comes to explicit acknowledgment.

I recall the simplicity and quiet resonance with which Dr. Suzuki could say, "Supreme affirmation: When hungry I eat, when tired I rest." The eating, the resting, the saying too: embodiment of wholeheartedness. I imagine it as having carried into his dying, when he died full of years. As I knew him he was as if death might have come upon him at any time for that matter without finding him unready. Not was he a man of resignation. I can still see him with that exquisite Japanese girl in her twenties whom he married in his late seventies as they walked hand-in-hand one day on a high bluff overlooking the Atlantic; a miniature of life they seemed in that vast natural setting.

And now, under pressure of the need to catch up on our pace in the notes, I shall merely indicate certain references we also touched upon in this meeting without elaboration on them or weaving them into continuity.

(1) Dostoevsky's "The Grand Inquisitor" in The Brothers Karamazov as a suggestive (and sardonic) treatment of the premium people are wont to place on security in the form of relief from being placed in question.

(2) The classic analysis of passion in Plato's Republic (see especially VI, 484 A – 487 A, and VIII 543 A-IX, 588A) in Spinoza's Ethics, Books 4 & 5, and in Aristotle's discussion of self-indulgence, incontinence, continuance, and temperance (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII). We discussed in particular Aristotle's problem (VII, 3) as to whether, and in what sense, one acting incontinently can be said to be acting knowingly or not. The suggestion emerged that he would know what he is doing, but not in the mode of acknowledgment (which would involve a genuine commitment of himself). And subsequent to having acted incontinently, the same alternative modes of knowing would underlie the distinction between his feeling remorse or coming to repentance.

(3) On the seventh page of the tenth essay in our collection knowing of oneself and of others in the mode of acknowledgment is touched on as central in inflecting our passional dispositions, as in relationship with one another. This point seems to be the crux of Buber's reading of the Second Commandment as having to do with the possibility of loving one's neighbor as one like unto oneself. (The reference is given in footnote five).

(4) This consideration brought to mind two texts: (i) the force of Rabelais' airing of our embodied passional dispositions in such a way that – if we are willing to hear him – we are brought to a liberating and knowing acknowledgment of ourselves with respect to them. There is a sense of communion and celebration in that. (ii) I tried to convey the gist of Macbeth Act IV, Scene iii, lines 44-138, in which we hear Malcolm paradoxically acknowledging all the passional evils of which he would be capable were he to succeed Macbeth to the throne of Scotland, and then, paradoxically, coming to acknowledge himself as quite free of those dispositions. That is more than Macduff can make sense of.

(5) Finally, we reflected on the ambiguity of 'consuming passion.' In the inferno, for example, we see Philippo Argenti consumed by his own rage and Capaneus consumed in blasphemous rage. We also see the wayward passion which mastered the cultivated Brunetto working dialectically off of a sterile life. In Augustine's passionate grief over the loss of his friend the underlying element of grievance and resentment, so that when he reached an intensity of despair in which he bid his soul "Trust in God, she very rightly obeyed me not, because that most dear friend, whom she had lost, was, being man, both truer and better, than that phantasm she was bid to trust in." (Confessions, Bk. IV, 9th paragraph.) We ended with some consideration of the passionate involvement of Vincent and of Cezanne in their vocation as painters. Both consuming and wholehearted involvement in work bring passion to intensive concentration. We left off musing on the possibility of such concentration being dispositionally disponsible or not with respect to rightful claim upon concern arising from sources beyond the immediate pale of one's work. Absorbed immersion can certainly make for exclusion, insensitivity, neglect – perhaps most often, though not always, quite inadvertently. At any rate, in the case of Vincent, I think we can see that the range of his devotion to fellow creatures provided the amplitude and matrix in

which his concentration in painting did not narrow the man or confine his sympathies.

12th meeting, Tuesday, May 8

This was our first meeting on the essays of Heidegger selected for the seminar, beginning with the lecture "On Time and Being" in the volume in translation bearing that title. Particularly difficult through this writing is, it had seemed to me that it might place us on central location for an appreciation of 'where he is coming from' in the thought to concern us. And with the generous help which Albert Borgmann gave us during our first hour, I am encouraged to think that the risk of this beginning was worth taking.

From Being and Time (1927) Heidegger's path of thought extends a long way, and "On Time and Being," we note, is dated January 31, 1962. It postdates all of the seminal writings in Poetry, Language, Thought, to which we will turn, by at least eleven years. (see the original dates of these writings given under "References," pages XXIV – XXV of the latter volume.) As Albert remarked, "As Heidegger thinks on he lets that which moves him in the writing of Being and Time come to the surface. And he becomes more willing to acknowledge the provincial (i.e., 'the local'?) in its pertinence to his themes." And it should be remembered that "he comes from a Christian local (in Messkirch), through and through."

When I talked with Heidegger in 1955 it became apparent that he was still explicitly and virtually exclusively of the mind to emphasize the fundamental affinity of his though with the Greek origins of Western philosophical tradition. Yet even then, it appears, he had written "A Dialogue on Language" (1953/54), now accessible in On The Way to Language (Harper & Row, 1971), in which a strong interest on his part in a strain of Oriental thought is developing in this dialogue (between a Japanese and "an Inquirer"). And I understand that some time subsequent to that he came to discover The Book of Tao and to acknowledge a profound affinity with what he found to be basically thematic there. During the few minutes before Albert could arrive at our meeting we listened to what may be resounding in the First Chapter of this text: It is in accord with an ultimate and unvarying way (which cannot be named) that all varying and nameable ways are originating. Indeed it is "from the Nameless that Heaven and Earth spring" – within which the creatures are reared, "each of its kind." And then we hear that man – in so far as he is attached to the creaturely "can see only the Outcomes," failing to participate knowingly in their sourcing – in which sourcing he too would discover himself deriving were he not to remain oblivious in fastening onto "the ten thousand things" which are made manifest to him. Isn't there something reminiscent here of Heidegger's thought on preoccupation with beings in their presencing and obliviousness with respect to the giving of being and time in the way of appropriation from 'a source' which remains in his thought nameless -- the 'it' in "in gives being, it gives time." If there is a speaking appropriate to "this matter," Heidegger is surely convinced as to what that speaking cannot be. It cannot be fundamentally and rigorously in the mode of a speaking about, in the language of referential knowledge. His emphasis on 'the unspoken' which for him is of the essence of the most true and fundamental speaking – the ultimate burden and

purport, as it were, of such speaking – suggests a bespeaking in his thought of that which remains in it unspoken. The acknowledgment remains tacit.

That there is a religious sensibility here that goes very deep, underlying Heidegger's thought, will become unmistakable to us, I think. While it finds a certain kinship with reflective themes and the spirit of the Tao Te Ching, moreover, I do not think that sensibility is itself "Taoist." His difficulty seems rather one of finding a way in thoughtful speaking – at this historical juncture – from within language traditions of the West – and a way at the same time consonant with a sensibility rooted in and though Christian tradition more basically than in that of the gods of Hellas, however much (with Holderlin) he may also partake of the latter.

At any rate, Albert acquainted us with certain strong intimations of 'where Heidegger is coming from,; even from the time when as a lad he participated in the ringing of the bells of St. Martin in Messkirch, where his father was a sacristan; bells which tolled the events of human like in the profundity of their meaning, partaking both of the everyday rhythms and of the most consecrated occasions – birth, baptism, marriage, death….; each bell with its own name and appropriate occasions, yet one tolling – as of forever and evermore, suffusing their intonations. Of this Heidegger wrote in a piece, "Of the Mystery of the Bell Tower," with which Albert is familiar and I am not.

In the second line of the poem which is central for the essay "Language," to which we will come – "Long tolls the vesper bell," the mood is suggested in which the thought of that essay moves. In particular, let me quote here a sentence from this essay (p. 199): "The tolling of the evening bell brings then, as mortals, before the divine." (underlining added).

In the little piece, "The Country Path," a tolling bell in the deepening of night gathers up in its sounding of stillness an evocation of the untimely dead, and a summoning of an answering renunciation of which Heidegger says that it spells – not a loss – but a giving and a receiving of the inexhaustible strength of the simple.

Albert proceeded to acquaint us with a development bearing on the lecture "On Time and Being." In this lecture the force of "it gives"….being and time…. Is centrally in question, and Heidegger emphasizes that in this giving 'that which gives' is intrinsically such as to withdraw and withhold itself in the very manner of the giving and in favor, as it were, of the salience of what is presencing as thus being given. One may be inclined to say the "It" in "It gives" remains utterly enigmatic in the context of this lecture. At any rate 'it' remains nameless here; and in respects compelling for Heidegger perhaps 'it' registers as unnamable. Yet…in an essay, "The Question of God in Heidegger's Thought" (published in a book On the Trail of the Eternal) a Catholic priest and theologian (also a fellow 'Messkirchian") Bernhard Welte argued that the "it" in "it gives" should be understood as God in Heidegger's thought even though not named as such. In that for Heidegger God is ineffable, more unspeakable than "Being" or even "Appropriation." Now it seems that Heidegger received Welte's argument not only with respect but even with acknowledgment that it was well taken.

In 1974, Stanilus Ladusans from Sao Paulo, Brazil, requested of Heidegger a contribution to an anthology on contemporary European philosophy. Heidegger suggested that Welte's "God in Heidegger's Thought" (1973) with a few lines by Heidegger be included instead. "This was done," Welte says, "and so I appeared, so to speak, as Heidegger's representative in this book in Brazil." In 1976, Heidegger asked Welte to speak at Heidegger's funeral. These references are from Welte's "Recollection of a Late Conversation" in Remembrance of Martin Heidegger (1977).

I think that several things might be added to the sketch of this telling development : One, that Heidegger clearly was a man of profound sense of discretion in his speaking and would have wished to avoid like the plague all that has transpired in Christiandom by way of 'God-talk.' Second, the theological tradition of God as "prima causa" and "ens realissimum") is profoundly alien to his own thought, on page 161 of The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays one may well note the sentence, "Even God is represented in Theology – not in faith – as causa prima, as first cause." A radical differentiation seems alluded to and called for in this passing but surely not casual remark. How might 'faith' speak in reflective acknowledgement of God and with what implications for our understanding of being-in-the-world… in time; and for the meaning of 'appropriation?' Or would acknowledgment of God in faith be something apart from reflective explication and discourse? I find myself left wondering where Heidegger might have stood on such questions. Though it is significantly apparent in "On Time and Being" how Heidegger is struggling with locations that do not 'sit' properly as propositions fixed in the sentence structure of accustomed thought. "Our task is unceasingly to overcome the obstacles that tend to render such saying in adequate:; [i.e., as pertaining to a thinking explicitly entering Appropriation "in order to say it in terms of it about It"] (p.24). (See also pages 40 and 42 about the inadequacy of 'propositional statements' in this regard.)

Finally, it may not be inappropriate to mention that Heidegger seemed to at least many who were personally acquainted with him a rather deeply shy man. That shyness seemed to recede as he would get down to his accustomed way of working…. Yet there remained a sort of tacit, unobtrusive reserve… a silent accompaniment of his vigorous thought.

At the close of Albert's visit with us the force of the expression Ereignis was given a little preliminary consideration. Etymologically, he though that the expression probably owed its derivation in the language to Er-augnis in the sense of 'a catching sight'; and it may well be that for Heidegger something of that derivation is retained as at least a pertinent implication of Ereignis. (I will risk the suggestion that an analogy might obtain between a catching sight of something and becoming alerted – a dawning on one—with respect to what is at issue; what is going on in Ereignis. It quickens surmise and sets one on a long, life-long path of thought in which it is as if one were trying to trace and recover some inestimable treasure eluding recall which yet haunts one from of old. One is reminded of Thoreau's "hint at some of the enterprises which I have cherished" leading him to exclaim, "To anticipate, not the sunrise and the dawn merely, but, if possible, Nature herself!" – Walden, Modern Library, page 15.)

At any rate, the lexical meaning of the expression has to do with happening, occurrence, event, but very likely with the force of eventfulness pertaining to what happens, in that events are charged with significance, even imbued with a destinate character. That would not stretch the expression too far as it extends into Heidegger's vocabulary, for clearly Ereignis, as he means it, is not an event among others, but pertains embracively to all being-in-time in its destinate character.

Yet the force of the expression cannot be abstracted from our involvement in what is meant. And in this respect I think we find particular warrant for the translation of Ereignis by "Appropriation." Even if not warranted on etymological grounds, the expression seems to acquire decisive resonance from eigen, 'own,' suggesting a belonging and an appropriate belonging. On Heidegger's account it is in and of and from Ereignis that we are as claimed and in a manner appropriate for our own essential human mode of being and for our coming into our own. So far forth Appropriation would seem a matter for an acknowledging knowing which could only come to pass in our willingly coming to find ourselves in the way in which we are claimed in our concern – as respondents.

The second hour:

"On Time and Being" seems to place us at a critical juncture in Heidegger's thinking. I do not mean that this 'juncture' is by any means segregated in the thought of that essay, but rather that the essay reflects and turns upon a working from former thought into an inflection which it has taken on in the course of the essays to which we will turn in Poetry, Language, Thought. Earlier on, and for a long time, Heidegger's central concern was with what he called "the question of Being" and correspondingly with "unconcealment and concealment." Thinking back, he is inclined to take it that "the truth of Being/Its truth as such, has never attained to language, but has remained in oblivion." (On Time and Being, p. 29). And the obliviousness in question is not to be understood as a matter of omission on the part of previous thinkers but partakes of something fundamental in the matter to be thought out …. A "concealing" intrinsic to it. "The fundamental experience of Being and Time" is spoken of as "that of the oblivion of Being." (p.29) There is a "self-concealment" on the part of the way in which Being is given. If Being and Time reflects an awakening in and with respect to oblivion with respect to Being, "Time and Being" seems to reflect an awakening from oblivion with respect to Being and into Appropriation. This latter awakening, in his thought, taken on the character of "the step back" from metaphysics. It is more deeply recollective of what 'underlies' oblivion with respect to Being, and conjoins Time-and-Being in the way in which beings come to – and are received as – presencing. Underlying what could be conceived as oblivion with respect to being and the intrinsic concealment pertaining to it, thinking within awakening into Appropriation begins to understand what the truth of Being might entail deriving from within Appropriation, and therein the possibility of a basic obliviousness hinges on the radical self-concealment or "withdrawal" of 'the source' of the giving of Time-and-Being.

Now, later in the Summary of the Seminar on "On Time and Being," in answer to the question, 'What does Appropriation appropriate?' we read "…at the end of the lecture on identity (given June 27, 1957) it is stated what Appropriation appropriates, that is, brings into its own and retains in Appropriation: namely, the belonging together of Being and man. In this belonging together, what belongs together is no longer being and man, but rather – as appropriated – mortals in the fourfold of world." (page 42). Thus thinking in terms of Appropriation from within Appropriation leads expressly into the thematic constellation of the thought in a number of the essays to which we will turn. Furthermore the essay "Language" falls into place in this connection. Note in the paragraph on page 42 just quoted from "…in addition, everything that was said about language as Saying belongs here." (The reference is to On the Way to Language, from which the essay "Language" was excerpted to be included in Poetry, Language, Thought.)

In awakening into Appropriation "the step back" from metaphysical thought becomes possible. I wonder if this matter is not essentially akin to reflection receiving its deepest sponsorship and guidance in receuillement, wherein our belonging and an acknowledging mode of knowing are centrally at issue – as Marcel's thought intimates. Here the sway of representational thinking can be discerned in that one is not unwittingly simply given over to it, but called into a mode of thinking more consonant with one's essential mode of being as called upon, and as ultimately engaged with the beings of the world. (Note: I doubt if what Heidegger is getting at in connection with Appropriation in its import needs to obviate the language of being and beings; rather it might convert that language, so that we might speak of 'mode of being,' and of being with a low case 'b.' The question would then remain: what might be the essential mode of being….. of ourselves, of things, or world…and in what way participated?)

It was not to Marcel bit to Augustine that we turned toward the close of this introductory session on Heidegger. We dwelt on two main points: (1) on how Augustine comes to understand in retrospect how his attempt to think what God might mean in his accustomed representational manner of thinking was the chief 'obstacle' to his getting anywhere in his attempts. He found he just couldn't picture (and then depict accordingly) what God might mean. (2) With this point in mind we meditated on the force of the expression concerning God which comes to him in the course of his response to the question, "What art Thou then, my God?" The expression: "…most hidden, yet most present…" (See Bk I, paragraph 4, Confessions). In what sense "most hidden?" The notes on page 3 of the meetings of April 24 and 26 touch on this point. We recalled Isaiah 45:15, too: "Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself."

Heidegger inclines to speak of God as presencing in the mode of absence in our time. Or, as Holderlin seems to do, to talk of "the default of God" (p.91, P.L.T.). His speech so far forth does not seem to carry the force of an acknowledging response. Of course Heidegger himself emphasizes that his thought is prepatory at most for a thinking that may come in consonance with Appropriation and the step back. But a question remains even so as to whether the sourcing implied in Appropriation can be thought in consonance with the divine as presencing in the mode of absence.

In our town time, are we capable, or may be become capable of speaking in a vein at least equivalent to the speaking of Isaiah and of Augustine, which would carry the force of an acknowledging response? Or even as in the simplest of responses, perhaps, as with the patriarchs of Tanak: "Here am I."

18th meeting, Tuesday, May 29

The meeting was woven of reflection on the following supplementary material.

I. From What is Called Thinking (195102) Harper & Row, 1968:

1. 11 – "Poetry wells up only from devoted thought thinking back, recollecting."

2. 16 – "only when man speaks does he think…"
   "all the work of hand is rooted is rooted in thinking."

3. 19- "Beauty is a fateful gift of the essence of truth, and here truth means the disclosure of what keeps itself concealed. The beautiful is not what pleases, but what falls within the fateful gift of truth which comes to be when that which is eternally non-apparent and therefore invisible attains its most radiantly apparent appearance."
4. 25 – "the will to action…has overrun and crushed thought."
5. 72 – "creativeness –which….comes only to those who are capable of reverence."
6. 77 – "The only thing of which 'sound common sense' is least capable is acknowledgment and respect." (single quotes added)
7. 92 – "Since long ago, that which is present has been regarded as what is. But what representational ideas can we for of that which was? At this "it was," idea and its willing take offense. Faced with that "was," willing no longer has anything to propose. This "it was" resists the willing of that will. The "it was" becomes a stumbling block for all willing. It is the block which the will can no longer budge. Then the "it was" becomes the sorrow and despair of all willing, which, being what it is, always wills forward, and is always foiled by the bygones that lie fixed firmly in the past. Thus the "it was" is revolting and contrary to the will. This is why revulsion against the "it was" arises in the will itself when it is faced with this contrary root within willing itself. Willing endured the contrary within itself as a heavy burden; it suffers from it – that is, the will suffers from itself. Willing appears to itself as this suffering from the "it was," as the suffering from the bygone, the past. But what is past stems from the passing. The will – in suffering from this passing, yet being what it is precisely by virtue of this suffering – remains in its willing captive to the passing. Thus will itself wills passing. The will's revulsion against every "it was" appears as the will to pass away, which wills that everything be

worthy of passing away. The revulsion arising in the will is then the will against everything that comes and goes and exists, in order to depose, reduce it in its stature and ultimately decompose it. This revulsion within the will itself, according to Nietzsche, is the essential nature of revenge.

8. 104 – "…what is revolting to the will fades away when the past does not freeze in the mere "it was," to confront willing in fixed rigidity."
9. 118-119 – "For language plays with our speech – it likes to let our speech drift away into the more obvious meaning of words. It is as though man had to make an effort to live properly with language."
10. 128 – "…thought and poesy are in themselves the originary, the essential, and therefore also the final speech that language speaks through the mouths of man." "…To speak language is totally different from employing language. Common speech merely employs language."
11. 130 – "Words are not terms, and thus are not like buckets and kegs from which we scoop a content that is there. Words are wellsprings that are found and dug up in the telling, wellsprings that must be found and dug up again and again, that easily cave in, but that at times also well up when least expected. If we do not go to the spring again and again, the buckets and kegs stay empty, or their content stays stale."
12. 144- "The <u>thanc</u>, the heart's core, is the gathering of all that concerns us, all that we care for, all that touches us insofar as we are, as human beings."
13. 159 – <u>Thinking does not</u>

    (1) "bring us knowledge as do the sciences."
    (2)
    (3) "produce usable practical wisdom."
    (4) Solve "cosmic riddles."
    (5) "endow us directly with the power to act."

"As long as we still subject thinking to these four demands, we shall overrate and overtax it."

14. 187 – "use implies fitting response." Not utilization not a mere needing ("degenerate and debauched form of use"). "Proper use does not debase what is being used."

    "…only proper use brings the thing to its essential nature and keeps it there."

    "The essential nature of use can thus never be clarified by merely contrasting it with utilization and need." (Since they fall short of proper use.)

15. 192 – "…we are moving within language, which means moving on shifting ground or, still better, on the billowing waters of an ocean."
16. 242 – "In the presence of what is present there speaks the call that calls us into thinking."

II. From Identity and Difference (1957), Harper and Row, 1969.

17. 38 – "For language is the most delicate and thus most susceptible vibration holding everything within the suspended structure of the appropriation. We dwell in the appropriation inasmuch as our active nature is given over to language."
18. 39 – "In the event of appropriation vibrates the active nature of what speaks as language, which at one time was called the house of being." (in the "Letter on Humanism").

III. From On the Way to Language (1953-1959), Harper and Row, 1971.

19. 57 - "To undergo an experience with something: means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us. . .the experience [undergone] is not of our own making; to undergo means here that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us submit to it." (es gibt)

    88 – by virtue of the gift of the word there is, the word gives.

20. 90 – Poetry and thinking: the nearness that draws them near is itself the occurrence of appropriation…"

    "but if the nearness of poetry and thinking is one of Saying, then our thinking arrives at the assumption that the occurrence of appropriation acts as that Saying in which language grants its essential nature to us. Its vow is not empty. It has in fact already struck its target – whom else but man? For man is man only because he is granted the promise of language, because he is needful to language, that he may speak it."

21. 93-4 - "poetry and thinking are modes of saying. The nearness that brings poetry and thinking together into neighborhood we call Saying. Here, we assume, is the essential nature of language. "To say," related to the Old Norse 'saga' means to show: to make appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call World, lighting and concealing it.

    This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is the essential being of Saying. The guide-word on the way within the neighborhood of poetry and thinking holds an indication which we would follow to come to that nearness by which this neighborhood is defined. The guide-word runs: The being of language: the language: the language of being."

22. 94-5 – "…we shall comprehend what language is as soon as we enter into what the colon, so to speak, opens up before us. And that is the language of being. In this phrase being, "essence" assumes the role of the subject that possesses language. However, the word "being" now no longer means what something is. We hear "being" as a verb, as in "being present" and "being absent." "To be" means to perdure and persist. But this says more than just "last and abide." "it is in being" means "it persists in its presence," and in its persistence concerns and moves us. Such being, so conceived, names what persists, what concerns us in all things, because it moves and makes a way for all things. Therefore, the second phrase in the guide-world, "the language of being," says this, that language belongs to this persisting being, is proper to what moves all things because that is its most distinctive property. What moves all things moves in that it speaks. But it remains quite obscure just how we are to think of essential being, wholly obscure, therefore, what to speak means. This is the crux of our reflection on the nature of language."

IV. In the essay "Language," page 205 (Poetry, Language and Thought) a key expression, "Pain," is not sufficiently elucidated. In this volume see pages 7, 97, and 130 (the reference to Rilke; then think of the letter on the Ninth Elegy and the Letters to a Young Poet in connection with 'suffering.'

In On the Way to Language, page 153, we read, "But the more joyful the joy, the more pure the sadness slumbering within it. The deeper the sadness, the more summoning the joy resting within it. Sadness and joy play into each other. The play itself which attunes the two by letting the remote be near and the near be remote is pain. This is why both, highest joy and deepest sadness, are painful each in its way. But pain so touches the spirit of mortals that the spirit receives its gravity from pain. That gravity keeps mortals with all their wavering at rest in their being."

THE NINTH ELEGY

Why, if it's possible to spend this span
Of existence as laurel, a little darker than all
Other greens, with little waves on every
Leaf-edge (like the smile of a breeze), why, then,
Must we be human and, shunning destiny,
Long for it? . . .

Oh, not because happiness,
That over-hasty profit of loss impending, exists.
Not from curiosity, or to practice the heart,
That would also be in the laurel . . .
But because to be here is much, and the transient Here
Seems to need and concern us strangely. Us, the most transient.
Everyone once, only once. Just once and no more.
And we also once. Never again. But this having been once, although only once,
to have been of the earth,
Seems irrevocable.

And so we drive ourselves and want to achieve it,
Want to hold it in our simple hands,
In the surfeited gaze and in the speechless heart.
Want to become it. Give it to whom? Rather
Keep all forever . . . but to the other realm,
Alas, what can be taken? Not the power of seeing,
Learned here so slowly, and nothing that's happened here.
Nothing. Maybe the suffering? Before all, the heaviness
And long experience of love – unutterable things.
But later, under the stars, what then? They are better untold of.
The wanderer does not bring a handful of earth,
The unutterable, from the mountain slope to the valley,
But a pure word he has learned, the blue
And yellow gentian. Are we here perhaps just to say:
House, bridge, well, gate, jug, fruit tree, window –
At most, column, tower . . . but to say, understand this, to say it
As the Things themselves never fervently thought to be.
Is it not the hidden cunning of secretive earth
When it urges on the lovers, that everything seems transfigured
In their feelings? Threshold, what is it for two lovers
That they wear away a little of their own older doorsill,
They also, after the many before,
And before those yet coming. . . .lightly?

Here is the time for the unutterable, here, its country.
Speak and acknowledge it. More than ever
The things that we can live by are falling away,
Supplanted by an action without symbol.
An action beneath crusts that easily crack, as soon as
The inner working outgrows and otherwise limits itself.
Our heart exists between hammers,
Like the tongue between the teeth,
But notwithstanding, the tongue
Always remains the praiser.

Praise the world to the angel, not the unutterable world;
You cannot astonish him with your glorious feelings;
In the universe, where he feels more sensitively,
You're just a beginner. Therefore, show him the simple
Thing that is shaped in passing from father to son,
That lives near our hands and eyes as our very own.
Tell him about the Things. He'll stand more amazed, as you stood
Beside the rope-maker in Tome, or the potter on the Nile.
Show him how happy a thing can be, how blameless and ours;
How even the lamentation of sorrow purely decides
To take form, serves as a thing, or dies
in a thing, and blissfully in the beyond
escapes the violin. And these things that live,
slipping away, understand that you praise them;
transitory themselves, they trust us for rescue,
us, the most transient of all. They wish us to transmute them
in our invisible heart – oh, infinitely into us! Whoever we are.

Earth, isn't this what you want: invisibly
To arise in us? Is it not your dream
To be some day invisible? Earth! Invisible!
What, if not transformation, is your insistent commission?
Earth, dear one, I will! Oh, believe it needs
Not one more of your springtimes to win me over.
One, just one, is already too much for my blood.
From afar I'm utterly determined to be yours.
You were always right and your sacred revelation is the intimate death.
Behold, I'm alive. On what? Neither childhood nor future
Grows less . . . surplus of existence
Is welling up in my heart.

And is it I who may give the Elegies their right explanation? They reach out infinitely beyond me. I hold them for a further shaping of those essential assumptions already given in the 'Stundenbuch,' that in the two parts of the 'Neue Gedichte' at play with the

picture of the world experimentally and then in Malte, drawn together at cross purposes, strike back into like and there almost lead to the conclusion that this life thus suspended in the groundless is impossible. In the 'Elegies,' from the same premises, life becomes possible again, indeed it here comes to know that final affirmation to which young Malte, although on the difficult right road 'des longues etudes,' was not yet able to lead it. Affirmation of life AND death appears as one in The 'Elegies'. To admit one without the other is, as is here learned and celebrated, a limitation that in the end excludes all infinity. Death is the side of life that is turned away from us: we must try to achieve the fullest consciousness of our existence, which is at home in the two unseparated realms, inexhaustibly nourished by both . . . The true figure of life extends through both domains, the blood of the mightiest circulation drives through both: There is neither a here not a beyond, but the great unity, in which those creatures that surpass us, the 'angels', are at home. And now the place of the love-problem in this world broadened by the larger half of itself, in this world only now complete, only now whole. It astonishes me that the 'Sonnets to Orpheus,' which are at least as 'difficult,' filled with the same essence, are not more helpful to your understanding of the 'Elegies.' These latter were begun in 1912 (at Duino), continued – fragmentarily – in Spain and Paris till 1914; the war completely interrupted this my biggest work; when I dared take it up again (here) in 1922, the new Elegies and their termination were preceded by the 'Sonnets to Orpheus,' which stormily imposed themselves (they were not in my plan). They are, as could not be otherwise, of the same 'birth' as the "Elegies,' and their sudden coming up, without my willing it, in association with a girl who died young, moves them still nearer to the well-spring of their origin; this association is one more connection towards the center of that realm the depth and influence which we, everywhere unboundaried, share with the dead and with those to come. We of this earth and this today, are not for a moment hedged by the world of time, nor bound within it. We are incessantly flowing over and over to those who preceded us and to those who apparently came after us. In that widest 'open' world all are, one cannot say 'simultaneously,' for the very falling away of time conditions their existing. Transience everywhere plunges into a deep being. And so all forms of this earth are not only not to be used in a time-limited way only, but, so far as we are able, to be given place in those superior significances in which we have a part. Not, however, in the Christian sense (from which I more and more passionately depart); but, in an earthly, a deeply earthly, a blissfully earthly consciousness we must introduce what is here seen and touched into that wider, that widest circuit. Not into a beyond the shadow of which darkens the earth, but into a whole, into the whole. Nature, the things we move among and use, are provisional and perishable; but, so long as we are here, they are our possession and our friendship, sharing the knowledge of our grief and gladness, as they have already been the confidants of our forebearers. Hence it is important not only to run down and degrade everything, earthly, but just because of its temporariness, which it shares with us, we ought to grasp and transform these phenomena and these things in a most loving understanding. Transform? Yes; for our task is so deeply and so passionately to impress upon ourselves this provisional and perishable earth, that its Essential being will arise again 'invisible' in us. We are the bees of the invisible. We frantically plunder the visible of its honey, to ACCUMULATE IT IN THE GREAT GOLDEN HIVE OF THE INVISIBLE. The 'Elegies' show us at this work, the work of these continual conversions of the beloved visible and tangible into the invisible vibration

and animation of our (own) nature, which introduces new frequencies into the vibration of the universe. (Since the various elements in the cosmos are merely different rates of vibration, we are preparing in this way not only new intensities of a spiritual sort but, who knows, new substances, metals, nebulae and stars.) And this activity is singularly supported and urged on through the ever more rapid disappearance of so much of the visible that is not going to be replaced. To our grandparents a 'house', a 'well', a tower familiar to them, even their own dress, their cloak, was still infinitely more, infinitely more intimate: almost each thing a vessel in which they found something human and into which they set aside something human. Now, from America, empty and indifferent things are crowding over us, sham things, life decoys . . .A house, in the American understanding, an American apple or a grapevine there, has nothing in common with the house, the fruit, the grape, into which went the hopes and meditations of our forefathers . . . Animated things, things experienced by us, and that know us, are on the decline and Cannot be replaced any more. We are perhaps the last still to have known such things. On us rests the responsibility of upholding not only the memory of them (that would be little and unreliable), but their human and laral worth (Laral in the sense of household gods.) The earth has no other way out than to become invisible: in us, who with a part of our being participate in the invisible, have (at least) certificates of participation in it, and can increase our holdings in invisibility during our being here, -- in us alone can be fulfilled this intimate and continual transformation of the visible into invisibility that is no longer dependent on the being visible and tangible, just as our destiny continually grows simultaneously more present and invisible in us. The Elegies set up this norm of existence; they affirm, they celebrate this consciousness. They carefully range it among its traditions, calling upon age-old transmissions and rumors of transmissions to support this conjecture and even invoking in the Egyptian cult of the dead a foreknowledge of such relationships. (Although the 'Lamentland' through which the else "Lament" leads the dead youth is not to be identified with Egypt, but is only, in a way, a reflection of the Nile country in the desert-clarity of the consciousness of the dead.) If one makes the mistake of holding up Catholic conceptions of death, of the beyond and of eternity, to the Elegies or Sonnets, one is getting entirely away from their point of departure and preparing for oneself a more and more thorough misunderstanding. The 'angel' of the Elegies has nothing to so with the angel of the Christian heaven (more nearly with the angelic figures of Islam) . . . The angel of the Elegies is that being which stands security for recognizing in the invisible as into their next-deeper reality; some starts heighten directly in intensity and pass away in the infinite consciousness of the angels – others are dependent on creatures who slowly and laboriously transform them, in whose terror and ecstasy they reach their next invisible realization. We are, be it emphasized once more, in the sense of the Elegies we are these transformers of the earth; our whole existence, the flights and downfalls of our love, all capacitate us for this task (besides which, essentially, no other holds). (The Sonnets show detail from this activity, which here appears placed under the name and protection of a dead girl whose incompletion and innocence holds open the door of the grace, so that she, gone from us, belongs to those powers who keep half of life fresh and open towards the other wound-open half.) Elegies and Sonnets continually bear each out --, and I see an infinite grace in my having been allowed to fill both these sails with one breath: the little rust-colored sail of the Sonnets and the gigantic white canvas of the Elegies.

May you, dear friends, find some advice and some elucidation here and, for the rest, continue to help yourself. For: I do not know whether I would ever be able to say more.