Study Questions for Mid-Term Examination: 2002

 

These Questions are in addition to those contained in your Weekly Questions!

 

 

Background Questions:

 

 

1)  Explain the attitude of the following figures to the relationship between Christianity and philosophy: a) Tertullian; b) Justin Martyr; c) Augustine.

 

2)  Explain what is meant by an allegorical or figurative reading of the Bible.  Why was developing this method of reading the Bible essential for monotheistic philosophy?

 

3)  Why is the Jewish philosopher Philo so important to Christian thinkers?  How does he differ from the Rabbis in interpreting the Bible?

 

4)  Explain the importance of the notions of Original Sin and Justification in Paul.  How do these concepts affect the philosophy of Augustine?

 

5) Explain the Christian concern for orthodoxy.  What are the chief tenets of the following heresies:, Pelagianism, Manicheanism?  Why is each considered a heresy by orthodox Christians?

 

6) How do Christians read the Torah differently from Jews?

 

7)  What are the meanings of the following rabbinical hermeneutical terms: P’shat; Remez; Drash; Sod. (See “Pardes” file on the front pages of MyClasses.)

 

 

Plotinus:

 

1)  Why was Neo-Platonism (the doctrine of Plotinus) so attractive to early Christian philosophers such as Augustine?

 

2)  Give a brief account of the three hypostasai and their generation in the Plotinian account of being.  Also discuss the role of hulé (matter) in his system.

 

3)  Starting with the problem of how entities are unities, give Plotinus' argument for the necessity of The One (to hen).

 

4)  Explain the Plotinian distinction of discursive and intuitive thought.

 

5)  Explain Plotinus' notion of beauty as it is revealed in the human being.

 

 

Augustine, Plato and Plotinus:

 

1)  Compare and contrast Plato and Augustine's accounts of Truth (see WP, 298-99).

 

2)  Contrast the thought of Augustine and Plotinus in relation to: a) Creation/Cosmos; b) Evil; c) G-d.

 

3) Explain the difference between Plotinus' notion of being and Augustine's.

 

4)  Why is the inner life of the Augustinian soul permeated with an anxiety unknown by Plotinus?

 

 

The City of God:

 

1)  In what manner does the omnipotence of G-d cause problems, when Augustine confronts the issue of how humans will to be good or evil?

 

2)  Why is the will not an evil for Augustine, even if it would choose to do evil?

 

3)  Discuss the ontological status of evil for Augustine and why it is so important for him to determine this status.

 

4)  How and why is immutability so important for Augustine?  How is it connected to his notions of being and of peace?

 

5)  Explain how Augustine characterizes the goodness of nature in The City of God and how his account might be taken to be environmentally aware in a contemporary sense.

 

6)  Why is the statement of G-d to Moses--I AM WHO AM--so important to Augustine?  How is this given a different interpretation in Midrash Rabbah?

 

7)  Contrast the city of man with the city of G-d.  How is peace at play in each of these? 

 

8)  Why does Augustine argue that slaves should accept their lot rather than rebelling against it?

 

9)  Explain Augustine's thoughts on predestination and how he might have failed to make full use of his own insight to resolve this issue.  (See: WP, 308-09)

 

10)  In what manner does Augustine justify the goodness of the predatory order of nature?  Why must he be insistent on seeing such an order as a mode of goodness?  What would Augustine have to say to those environmentalists who insist that we must take a biocentric perspective on nature (one that emphasizes nature in itself over human perspectives of nature)?

 

 The Confessions:

 

1) Discuss the nature of the Augustinian confessio.  Why is it necessary for Augustine's philosophical thinking (especially concerning G-d) to be in tension with this confessio?

 

2)  Distinguish "soul-time" or "inner-time" from chronological time.  For both Augustine and Plotinus, why is soul-time more real than chronological time?  In what manner is time an image of eternity?

 

3) Why can one not speak of creation as a beginning?

 

4)  Explain why eternity for Augustine is not the same as "a really really long time that never ends."

 

 

On the Trinity:

 

1)  Explain Augustine's account of the trinitarian structure of the human soul.

 

2) Discuss the problem that arises when Augustine thinks of G-d as an infinite personality, as opposed to the Greek tendency to think of G-d as an ultimate "reality."

 

3)  What does it mean that the soul is capex dei, capable of G-d?  In what sense is the soul an image of G-d?

 

4)  Explain how for Augustine the mind/soul is not a fixed substance (underlying various faculties or other characteristics of the mind) but a trinitarian mode of inter-relation.

 

5)  Explain how one's mind is an invenire, an “invening” (a coming into itself).

 

6)  Why does Augustine insist that one must hear the truth in one's heart in order to be able to philosophize authentically?  (How is it that one's approach to the truth is as dependent upon one's attentiveness as upon one's understanding?)

 

7)  Discuss how for Augustine G-d's being is not simply a principle but also an address, an illumination, to which one is called to be attentive.

 

 

Levinas “To the Other”:

 

1) What does Levinas mean by the “paradigmatic method” and why is it used by him in treating the theme of repentance and forgiveness?

 

2) What is a magical notion of forgiveness?

 

3)  Why is it dangerous to approach another who is need of forgiveness?

 

 

Discuss the meaning of the following sentences:

 

(On the Free Choice of the Will)

 

 "What do we do when we are eager to be wise?  Don't we with all possible keenness give our whole soul, so to speak, to what is mentally discerned, and keep it steadfastly fixed on that, so that it may not rejoice in any private possession of its own which will implicate it in transient things, but having put off all affections for things temporal and spatial, it may apprehend what remains ever one and the same?"

 

"Now that movement of "aversion," which we admit is sin, is a defective movement; and all defect comes from nothing."

 

"An errant horse is better than a stone that cannot err because it has neither motion nor feeling of its own.  So a creature which sins by its own free will is more excellent than one which cannot sin because it has no free will."

 

(City of God)

 

"It is, in fact, the very law of transitory things that, here on earth whether such things are at home, some should be born while others die, the weak should give way to the strong and the victims should nourish the life of the victors."

 

"All natures, then, are good simply because they exist and, therefore, have each its own measure of being, its own beauty, even, in a way, its own peace."

 

“Nevertheless, all alone as he (Caucus) was in a cave that was always "warm with the blood of some recent victim," his sole longing was for peace in which no force could do him harm and no fear disturb his rest.  Even with his own body he wanted to be at peace, and he was at ease only when peace was there."

 

"However, slavery is now penal in character and planned by that law which commands the preservation of the natural order and forbids its disturbance.  If no crime had ever been perpetrated against this law, there would be no crime to repress with the penalty of enslavement."

 

(Of the Trinity)

 

 "But the mind errs, when it so lovingly and intimately connects itself with these images, as even to consider itself to be something of the same kind."

 

"But they are three [memory, understanding and will], in that wherein they are mutually referred to each other; and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each, but also each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only is each contained by each, but also all by each."

 

 

(On Time)

 

"How, then, can these two kinds of time, the past and the future, be, when the past no longer is and the future as yet does not be?  But if the present were always present, and would not pass into the past, it would no longer be time but eternity...Does it not follow that we can truly say that it is time, only because it tends toward non-being?"