BACKGROUND (From Gilson on Finality,
Analogy, Causality)
The moral "reason" for creation lies in the goodness
of G-d. Such goodness is not
separable from G-d, G-d is not subject to goodness, as if it were other
than G-d. God is goodness
perfectly. Goodness
is diffusion and communication of itself inherently--this quality inherently
belongs to Being--i.e. generosity.
But humans are also generous.
Is to compare one mode of generosity to the other anthropomorphism?
Analogy=similarity but with a difference.
Humans are not perfectly being, therefore before the giving of what one
is (generosity), one has to be what one is not.
Therefore a balance between generosity and self-interest is found in humans
that is imperfect but also made possible by a yet more profound reality
of generosity. Thus one's
generosity and the world itself is an analogue of G-d's generosity.
Giving is given ultimately for G-d's sake.
Analogy attempts to think through the relation between
divine and human attributes by considering how being is communicated in
every causation.
Every cause produces an effect that resembles it--this
resemblance is not added to the cause, it is rather the very key to the
cause's efficaciousness.
Thus, because the universe is an effect of G-d, it
is an analogue of G-d.
The analogue bridges/compares 2 incommensurable orders
that do not add to or subtract from the other.
Thus, creation is not a substantial part of G-d.
If creation were to disappear, G-d would remain G-d.
But creation is also "more than an effect to which has been accidentally
added a resemblance to its cause."
Here the creature/being's existence and substantiality is an analogue to
G-d's being and substantiality.
Thus, creation as a mode of participation in and similitude
with G-d--a sacramental character to Being.
In Augustine's claim that TO BE G-d, is to
be strong, wise, one, etc, these names signify the divine substance.
CRUCIAL QUESTION: "Are the
two "to be"s equivalent?
For Maimonides absolutely not!
AQUINAS' ANSWER:
ARTICLE 2:Whether
any name can be applied to G-d substantially?
Via negativa of Maimonides expresses the distance of the creature from G-d or theasymmetry of the creature's relation to G-d (i.e. the way in which the creature is affected and effected by G-d without the relationship working the other way).
Aquinas finds three problems with Maimonides' position:
1)One
cannot assign a reason why some names more than others should be applied
to G-d. [possible response:
Maimonides' point is that one does not assign a name to G-d but categorically
denies another name. Thus
G-d is not not good, but this does not mean that not not a
is equivalent to a.
Thus, the fewer the names the better--all names are suspect.
Ultimately haShem (the Name as the unpronouncable tetragammon) is the only
name and it indicates the incapacity to name.)
2)
It would follow that all names applied to G-d would be said in a secondary
sense, i.e. there would be no way to assume what name of G-d is really
G-d's name. (possible response:
Wouldn't then the primary meaning of G-d's name be in the creature's G-d
created? This is to make
the creature prior to G-d.
But Maimonides would argue that these name are only secondarily to be said
of G-d. There is no primary
name.)
3)Maimonides'
position is against the basic intention of those who speak of G-d.
In saying that G-d lives, we mean to say more than that G-d is the
cause of life that G-d differs infinitely from inanimate bodies. (possible
response: Maimonides would
argue that such intentions to speak of G-d as living are idolatrous and
presumptuous.)
Therefore Aquinas' doctrine distinguishes between
signification, on the one hand, and representation and being on the other.
A substantial predication about G-d does not represent G-d as G-d is
but signifies what creatures already represent about G-d in their limited
perfections, their finite being.
Thus, names are predicated substantially of G-d but
short of representing G-d.
Analogy is now explicitly introduced:
Insofar as every creature approaches perfection, it represents G-d proportionally.
Thus, the statement, "G-d is good" means that whatever
good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in G-d.
Thus, G-d is not good because G-d causes goodness
but G-d causes goodness because G-d is good.
This is clarified in Aquinas' reply to objection 2 where he argues that
a claim about G-d signifies G-d as the principle itself whereby things
come to have their identity.
ARTICLE 5:Whether
What is Said of G-d and of Creatures is Univocally Predicated of Them?
No name belongs to G-d in the same sense it belongs
to a creature. Thus what is
said of G-d is said equivocally.
Why?
Because creatures receive the perfection of G-d as modifications of their
essences (beings), i.e. as something received.
Whereas for G-d these perfections "do not signify anything distinct from
His essence, or power, or being.
Thus, to call a human wise is to comprehend, to limit
what a man is, whereas to call G-d wise is "to leave the thing signified
as uncomprehended and as exceeding the signification of the name."
But this equivocation still holds an analogous
sense. The analogy mediates
between univocation and equivocation.
We can name G-d only from the creature!
The analogy turns out to be a mean between pure equivocation and simple
univocation.
Reply to obj. 1:
G-d is capable of producing G-d's own likeness.
What is the meaning of likeness?
Visual? Action? Effects?
But such a likeness does not represent the same thing even generically?
But according to Maimonides such a claim would be non-sensical.
Can the infinite, as Thomas claims, be compared to the finite?
How is one to interpret "the infinite"?