Abstract: Sociology has come to take up human rights as a substantive area in full only recently, much later than other key disciplines such as political science, law, and anthropology. As a result, sociological theories of human rights are relatively less developed, but such frameworks are crucial for the development of the unique contributions to the human rights topic that sociology can make. Foremost among these is conceptualizing the role of inter-relationships between social structure, human agency, and inequality as they impact human rights and efforts to promote them. This paper provides an overview of the emerging sociological theories of human rights of five sociologists with substantial work in the area: Gideon Sjoberg, Bryan Turner, Saskia Sassen, as well as Judith Blau and her co-author Alberto Moncada, with a primary emphasis on the work of Sjoberg. The human rights theories and concepts of each are compared around the issues of social structure, human agency, and inequality. Their work is then briefly considered in light of my own work in immigration, border enforcement and human rights, particularly in contrasting the human rights and citizenship frameworks for rights. Setting out the emerging sociological theoretical landscape on human rights is a crucial step for the development of the Sociology of Human Rights. At present, there is a flowering of recent sociological literature on human rights, but much of it is lacking in conceptual weight and debate of key theoretical issues that might point the way forward.
Sociology has come to take up human rights as a substantive area in full only recently, much later than other key disciplines such as philosophy, political science, law, and anthropology. As a result sociological theories of human rights are relatively less developed, but such frameworks are crucial for the development of the unique contributions to the human rights topic that sociology can make. Foremost among these is conceptualizing the role of relationships between social structure, human agency, and inequality as they impact human rights and efforts to promote them. This paper provides a brief overview of the emerging sociological theories of human rights of five sociologists with substantial work in the area: Gideon Sjoberg, Bryan Turner, Saskia Sassen, as well as Judith Blau and her co-author Alberto Moncada, with a primary emphasis on the work of Sjoberg. The human rights theories and concepts of each are compared around the issues of social structure, human agency, and inequality. Their work is then briefly considered in light of my own work in immigration, border enforcement and human rights, particularly in contrasting the human rights and citizenship frameworks for rights. Setting out the emerging sociological theoretical landscape on human rights is a crucial step for the development of the Sociology of Human Rights.

Sjoberg and Turner were the first sociologists to publish theoretical or largely conceptual works on human rights, each setting forth such in 1993, though Sjoberg also wrote on the topic specifically though more obliquely in the 1980s as part of a journey to address human rights that had began in earnest in the 1970s. Moreover, Sjoberg and his colleagues have provided much original theoretical conceptualization for a sociology of human rights inspired by empirical events (historical and contemporary), whereas Turner has taken the route of examining an intellectual history of sociology’s view of rights generally and then added his own theoretical innovations. Nonetheless, each has devoted substantial attention to the role of social structure, human agency, and inequality, as have Sassen, and Blau and Moncada. I argue that Sjoberg has elaborated the most extensively on these issues in developing a sociological framework for the study of human rights.

Key Contributors to the Sociology of Human Rights

As noted previously, sociology has come to the issue of human rights a bit later than a number of other disciplines. Hence, sociological conceptual work on human rights is still in relatively early stages. Nonetheless, a growing number of sociologists have begun to develop theoretical materials on human rights, out of which are emerging insightful, often contrasting views on central conceptual issues. I will
provide a brief overview of five prominent sociologists who have taken up theoretical work on a sociology of human rights from a variety of perspectives -- Judith Blau and Alberto Moncada, Bryan Turner, Saskia Sassen, and Gideon Sjoberg, with special emphasis on the innovative, yet under-recognized work of the latter. While admittedly over-simplifying the complex, sophisticated work of each, my goal is to provide some insight and an orientation for the emerging frameworks for a Sociology of Human Rights, as well as to briefly apply key aspects to immigration. My central focus is on how each author addresses the vital sociological topic of the relationship between human agency and social structure, and to also provide a brief overview of their work.

**Blau and Moncada**

Judith Blau with her co-author Alberto Moncada have generated to most voluminous work on Human Rights among US sociologists (Blau is from the US and Moncada from Spain) with four co-authored volumes on the subject since 2005 (Blau and Moncada 2005; 2006; 2007; 2009) and an edited with several others an anthology (Blau et al. 2008), while Blau also co-edited another with Frezzo (2012). Moreover, Blau was the leading force in the establishment, and the first chairperson, of the recently formed (2009) ASA section on Human Rights. In taking up human rights, it seems that their project is two-fold; first, to address the relationship between individual rights with social and economic rights. Second, and more substantively, they construct a strong critique of economic neo-liberalism / contemporary global capitalism and its extreme inequalities, using human rights as a primary basis for doing so, stressing the more social and economic rights provisions of human rights documents. They take a very discourse- and law-oriented approach generally, in focusing on and comparing international human rights treaties and declarations with nation-state laws and constitutions (Blau and Moncada 2006; Blau 2012). In general, Blau and Moncada human rights as an alternative logic to neo-liberal global capitalism, drawing on the framing of market vs. society (Blau and Moncada 2009: 20), conflicting logics that are expressed mainly within nation-states. They critique liberalism as the ideology that is conducive to capitalism and its extreme inequalities (Blau and Moncada 2005, Chapter 1). They do identify four key undergirding principles of human rights: dignity, liberty, equality, and brotherhood (Blau and Moncada 2007: 10-11); and in their view liberalism has long championed liberty, while human rights links it to the three other more social principles (dignity, equality, and brotherhood). Blau and Moncada also stressing that human rights are not dependent on fulfilling duties, that human rights are unconditional, but they do stress the sense of mutual obligation and responsibility for others as a key feature of human rights
(Blau and Moncada 2005: 153-154; 2009: 19-20); likewise Sjoberg sees duties as secondary to rights, and the latter clearly not dependent on the former (Sjoberg et al. 2001; Sjoberg 2009).

Human agency figures fairly prominently into Blau and Moncada’s view of Human Rights. Although their definition for human rights is largely a treaty-derived one, they do stress that they are the product of social struggles by subordinated groups and reactions to injustices committed against them (Blau and Moncada 2005: 63). More generally, they draw on Sartre and Arendt, in conceiving of human rights as rooted in human beings’ recognition of the other, which they pose as a sort of mutual solidarity that eliminates inequality while also recognizing differences between the various others (Blau and Moncada 2007: 176-178). [This is somewhat similar to Sjoberg’s emphasis on “taking the role of the other,” including divergent others, to recognize our mutual humanity, as a fundamental step in human rights, as we shall see later on, although Sjoberg stresses equal respect and dignity as a key feature of human rights, while Blau and Moncada stress equality and solidarity more so.] The notion of mutualism and solidarity as well as bottom-up participatory democracy are central to Blau and Moncada’s concern with human agency. They take a very broad view in interpreting a very wide and diverse range of activity as resistance to contemporary neo-liberal capitalism – e.g., the famous factory-worker co-ops in the Basque region of Spain, [semi-] communal land tenure systems of peasant agriculture in Mexico, fair trade projects, union struggles, and world social forums. Nearly any activity that makes use of an alternative logic to neoliberal capitalism is seen as resistance and as furthering human rights. Thus, they do provide a theory of human agency of sorts, a very broad notion of dynamic relationship between neo-liberal capitalism and popular resistance from a multiplicity of classes and social actors (all subordinated to some degree). On general level, in Blau and Moncada’s view, human rights is largely about human agency expressed in resistance to neoliberal capitalism and nation-state policies that support it and the attendant extreme economic inequalities within and between societies. Finally, Blau and Moncada are very interested in the construction of future alternative, adopting a decidedly utopian approach in sketching out alternatives for the future, going so far as to write a new U.S. constitution as well as sketching out key issues for a better world, again often drawing on nascent efforts to counter neo-liberal capitalism especially (see the concluding chapters in their four Human Rights books, Blau and Moncada 2005; 2006; 2007; 2009)

Turner
Bryan Turner is perhaps the most widely recognized sociologist writing on human rights, having begun his writings on the topic in 1993 followed by numerous works, most notably a 2006 book on human rights. His basic approach is to engage in an intellectual history of classical social theorists’ views on rights issues and the implications of them, while he focuses less on developing new social theoretical insights into human rights with one exception on the origins of human rights. Turner comes to the human rights topic from his previous writings on rights issues in citizenship theory (again taking a largely intellectual history approach rooted in the work of T.H Marshall [Turner 1990]), which he found lacking in the increasingly globalized Post-Cold War period emerging in the 1990s (Turner 1993). In that vein, one especially noteworthy point he made was that the human rights perspective was in fact a counterweight to abusive uses of nation-state authority, whereas citizenship is more about working with the state to seek greater rights. Specifically, Turner (1993:178) notes: “the point about ... human rights is that they are extragovernmental and have traditionally been used to counteract the repressive capacity of states.” Thus he recognized that, in contrast to citizenship theory, rights must be based on more than nation-state recognition or bequeathing, and the human rights view was a useful starting point. [However, Turner has contradictory views on the relationship between citizenship and human rights, sometimes seeing them in tension (1993, 2006: 139-140) and other times seeing them as complimentary (2006: 187).]

Turner has devoted much attention to what classical social theorists (Marx, Durkheim, and Weber), said about rights, or the implications of their work for views on rights, finding they took a quite dim view of rights – individualistic “bourgeois rights” in Marx’s terms which he thought were determined by the economic system, whereas the relativism and ostensible value neutrality Weber’s view left room for seeing rights beyond what a state determined they were, and likewise Durkheim’s work left little room for the rights of individuals or social actors given his stronger emphasis on social cohesion and community (Turner 1993; 2009). Thus, Turner proposes that sociology has had little to say about rights, and what attention was given to the topic has been has focused on social and economic rights rooted in the nation-state (e.g., in citizenship theory and social determinism) – the type of rights championed by Blau and Moncada -- and too little what he feels are more basic, individualistic human rights of civil and

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1 Turner moved from his early 1990s position of favoring human rights over the citizenship and an appreciation for human rights as a means to critique state repression. In 2006 he stated that there was no tension between human rights versus citizenship and the nation-state, as the latter was necessary to provide security necessary to realize the former (Turner 2006: 139-140) – thereby showing a rather naïve faith in the benevolent power of the nation-state that would leave us dependent on it. However, he cast the two in tension in 2009, contrasting human rights (more individualistic in his view) with what he termed “social rights” upheld by sovereign nations and adhering to citizens and their contributions (Turner 2009: 187).
political freedom type (Turner 2009). Moreover, he sees the former rights as tied to fulfilling duties to the state, whereas he feels human rights are not.

Turner critiques Weber’s “value neutrality” approach (his own contradictions to it proving it unworkable) and contends that sociology must not shy way from making an explicitly moral choice to address human rights, and to do so by bridging the divide between social structure and human agency. Turner critiques sociology for its social deterministic in stressing the dominant role of social structure and neglecting the role of human agency, countering that that sociology must “retain a vision of human autonomy and agency.... [and] a clear notion of the voluntary character of social action,” especially moral action as people with rights and choices (Turner 2009: 197). However, he does acknowledge that social structure places some limits on the social action of humans (ibid). Thus, Turner strives for a middle ground between social determinism and pure voluntarism, wherein we find the structural constraints on individuals but also recognize their capacity for action. This is an enormous middle ground, and beyond these broad, vague outlines, he offers nothing more on the relationship between structure and human agency. Sjoberg, as we shall see, offers a much more extensively elaborated, detailed, and nuanced model of the complex relationship between human agency and social structure.

Beyond the intellectual history, in his main innovation Turner takes up to the long-standing debate over the foundation or origin of rights, reviewing the Natural Law of rights doctrine and critique of it. Turner proposes a new basis for rights, the notion of universal (eventually for all) human frailty or vulnerability, as all people are subject to becoming frail and vulnerable at some point, especially early and late in life, thus all are deserving of basic protection and care, which is to say human rights. Moreover, he proposes that because we are frail, vulnerable creatures, we build institutions to protect ourselves, including human rights and international law among many others. And we do this in part also because human life is inter-connected and inherently social, not strictly individualized (Turner 2006: 25-44, 2012). This social view of human nature is in general related to Blau and Moncada’s view of human ability to recognize the other and develop mutual solidarity, though they see it (not human frailty) as the foundation for human rights.

**Sassen**

Saskia Sassen is another prominent sociologist who has taken up human rights as a central concern, though within her larger agenda of globalization and “global cities,” economic development, and immigration. Within her broader globalization concentration, she has singled out human rights specifically for special attention, initially claiming the increasing prominence of international human
rights norms, especially when applied to non-citizen immigrants, as well as international commerce, served as markers of globalization that signaled the decline of nation national sovereignty (Sassen 1996; 1998), though over-stating the effects of human rights discourse initially.² She developed the idea of globalization as entailing a process of “denationalization” in economics (especially), communications, as well as politics and rights, which again equates to a loss of national sovereignty (Sassen 2002; 2006; 2007). She proposes “denationalized citizenship” as a framework for rights rather than human rights, though they are largely inter-changeable for her. She sees rights and citizenship are delinked from nation states, though within nation states (via laws and court decisions) but in ways that place limits on state authority in favor of international human rights norms – examples of which are especially clear in the case of the expansion of rights for non-citizen (even unauthorized) immigrants (Sassen 2006: 306-309, 320-321, 413-414). Thus, in the end, human rights are the basis for her “denationalized citizenship,” but within a nation-state. She posits that the extension of human rights is an often slow process, coming gradually through an accumulation of partial and micro changes over time, but she does feel the expansion of rights is inevitable, even for the excluded and otherwise subordinated (Sassen 2007: 413-414). It seems that she conceptualizes an asymmetrical struggle between subordinated groups and the nation-state in the development of “denationalized citizenship” consisting largely of human rights.

Beyond this Sassen provides little elaboration on a theory of human rights, or the relationship between human agency and social structure. She devotes attention to the growing prominence of human rights in global documents and nation-state discourse and practices (e.g., court rulings), but is quite vague beyond that. She seems clearly interested in human agency of subordinated groups confronting massive social structure of globalization, global capital and the nation state. In this she devotes attention to how subordinate groups organize and advocate for their own interests in local, national, and transnational politics, who often drawing upon human rights norms, such as in the case of working class and working poor female and other immigrants (Sassen 2007, chapter 7). She is especially concerned with the means of communication (particularly internet) and the discourse these groups employ. Moreover, Sassen is clearly aware of the growing economic inequalities that globalization

² Focusing largely on discourse, she initially and naively implied that international human rights documents were comparable in their impact as were international commerce agreements (trade accords, etc.), as she framed both as decidedly undermining national sovereignty and the importance of the nation-state (Sassen 1996; 1998: 95-100) – though trade accord are quite enforceable and the human rights are largely not. Subsequently, she posited that the extension of human rights is much more limited, but still inevitable (Sassen 2006: 414).
entails. However, she does not offer a clear theory of the relationship between human agency and social structure, but rather more vague outlines of one in which subordinated groups use some aspects of globalization (human rights discourse, the internet) to seek greater rights from nation states, even for officially excluded groups, but she operates as such a macro abstract level that she does not clearly conceptualize how this comes about. However, Sassen has a broad and ambitious agenda in tackling globalization as a whole process and a variety of salient features -- from international financial flows, digital networks, shifting employment structures, global cities, the nation state, international migration - within which human rights is but one significant factor and its development is often most visible in the case of immigrants.

**Sjoberg’s Theory of Human Rights**

I would argue that Gideon Sjoberg (with many co-authors) has the longest, sustained track record among American sociologists of addressing human rights, as he has a twenty-five year period of writings, from 1984-2009, (as well as earlier related works) in which he and his colleagues constructed a nuanced, ambitious, multifaceted conceptual sociological model of human rights, based in large part on empirical cases and drawing on scholars in a wide range of fields (sociology, philosophy, law, political science, anthropology, and others). His work on human rights is among the very earliest (if not the earliest overall) by an American sociologist, and in my view is certainly among the most well developed and in-depth of any US sociologist’s. Drawing especially on Weber, Mead, Dewey, Habermas, Giddens, Beck, among others his theory of human rights is highly innovative and distinctive in providing sophisticated conceptual outlines of at least three key areas: the human agency-social structure relationship, bureaucracy and inequality (especially subordinate groups), and bureaucratic secrecy.

A good starting point is his uniquely sociological definition of human rights: “Human rights, as we conceive them, are claims made by persons in diverse social and cultural systems upon ‘organized power relationships’ in order to advance the dignity of (or, more concretely, equal respect and concern for) human beings” (Sjoberg et al. 2001: 25). This clear, yet more conceptual definition stresses the human agency-social structure relationship by putting human agents at center of the challenge of against organizational power and its affects on human dignity. He does dwell on the origins of human rights, though he acknowledges the debate on that, and he tends to view them more as a socially and historically produced phenomenon, starting with the American and French revolutions and especially focusing on the post-WWII, Post-holocaust era (Sjoberg et al. 2001). Moreover, on the topic of rights and duties, he see human rights as unconditional and not dependent on whether one fulfills duties,
while also acknowledging duties as a meaningful but secondary concern coming after rights, as the latter are essential to protect minority groups and beliefs whereas duties cannot (Sjoberg and Vaughan 1993; Sjoberg 1996; Sjoberg et al. 2001; Sjoberg 2009).

Before diving into the major conceptual issues, it is important to note a bit of how Sjoberg came to take up human rights as central sociological concern. His interest the sociology of human rights evolved from his earlier focus on ethics and morality in social research from the 1960s onward, including attention in 1970 and 1971 to the tension between universal norms and transnational human dignity versus nation-state laws and nationalism. For more than a decade thereafter Sjoberg (with Vaughan) embarked on a lengthy “journey through the wilderness” before arriving at the topic of human rights. In 1984, Sjoberg and colleagues first took up the issue of human rights explicitly in his writing, framing it in the discussion of the main moral orientations in sociology in practice (not just ideals) over-viewing and critiquing a wide range moral frameworks: the supposed value neutrality (of positivism), utilitarianism, nation-state morality, and cultural relativism. In turn, they propose a morality of universal rights, including human rights, as an alternative moral framework, drawing on rights philosophers such as Rawls, Dworkin and McIntyre (Sjoberg et al. 1984a; see also Vaughan and Sjoberg 1986). At the same time, Sjoberg and colleagues proposed the human rights tradition as the best means

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3 Sjoberg’s interest in ethics and morals is first clearly evident in his 1967 edited volume on research ethics, in which he discussed the US Army’s secret use of social scientists in its “Project Camelot” in Chile (Sjoberg 1967), followed by his extensive discussion of ethics and morals in his landmark 1968 research methods text informed by his distinctive sociology of knowledge approach (stressing the impact of broader society on sociologists and their research) (Sjoberg and Nett 1968, 1997), and then a chapter (Sjoberg and Nett 1970) on the 1960 trial in Jerusalem of captured high-ranking Nazi Adolph Eichmann, outlining the tensions between universalistic norms and nation-state laws. Shortly after, Sjoberg and Vaughan (1971; see also Sjoberg et al. 1995) addressed the sociology of ethics and critiqued the widespread nationalism they saw as the implicit, dominant ethical orientation of much sociology, and counter-posed the transnational dignity of [hu]mankind as a preferable moral orientation for sociology – a crucial concept that they later used in the development of a human rights orientation.

4 Sjoberg gives an extensive account of his lengthy, often trying journey in arriving at the topic of human rights in the 1970s and subsequently developing a distinctly sociological view on the topic (Sjoberg 1989; 2005).

5 Sjoberg and colleagues overview and critique Value Neutrality ala both positivism in social science and Weber as an ideal rarely upheld in practice, particularly not by Weber himself; utilitarianism for its hyper individualism, basis for narrow cost-benefit analysis, and rational choice / exchange theory underpinnings; nation-state morality [later termed system commitment morality] as leading to moral problems by following state agendas, and cultural or moral relativism as an amorality that leads to ethical and moral problems. They propose human rights as a superior moral universal framework (Sjoberg et al. 1984a). Subsequently, Sjoberg (Sjoberg et al. 1995a; 1995b; Sjoberg 1996) also addressed communitarianism as a moral framework in sociology, which he critiqued for being overly concerned with duties of individuals (not organizations) to communities (including the nation) and skeptical of rights. Sjoberg later noted that morals, including the human rights perspective, are cultural and social products, and thus worthy of sociological inquiry (Sjoberg et al. 2001: 14) And interestingly, he proposes that the human rights orientation is actually a means to further objectivity in that it provides a universal standard by which to evaluate organizations and other social actors, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of ethnocentrism, nation-state or system commitment morality, and cultural relativism.
for constructing some moral accountability to address the key social problem of powerful bureaucratic organizations, drawing on Weber as well as contemporary cases, and their adverse impact on the disadvantaged groups via a process of “triage” or sacrificing the most vulnerable (to be discussed later) (Sjoberg et al. 1984b). Thus, Sjoberg and colleagues over a period of some fifteen years developed work on moral orientations in sociology (and society) that led them to a human rights framework, informed by a central concern for the relationship between bureaucratic power (based on Weber’s work) and disadvantaged groups, and soon expanded to human agency (drawing on Mead and Dewey).

The most two distinctive features of Sjoberg’s theory of human rights is an over-riding focus on both the bureaucracy / complex organizations and the role of human agency in relation to it, linking social structure with human agency. His central concern with bureaucracy builds on Weber’s classic work in viewing the social world rife with bureaucratic power (both state and corporate), ala Weber’s “iron cage” – all with special concern for their impact on the most vulnerable or subordinated groups. Hence, his human rights writings include overview of the key features of bureaucracy, such as hierarchy, the division of labor (as both constraining and enabling individuals), standardization, rules and regulations, and so on. However, he moves beyond Weber’s account to also include more critical issues relating to power and inequality, including that those further up the hierarchy have more discretion to interpret the rules, and they also often delegate blame (for problems) to underlings in the guise of responsibility as they generally do not delegate real authority. Moreover, he looks at the contemporary global scene to discuss the rise of transnational bureaucratic structures, such as multinational corporations, organizations in finance capital, the media and so on (Sjoberg et al. 1984b; Sjoberg and Vaughan 1993: 137-139; Sjoberg 1996: 282-283, Sjoberg 1999; Sjoberg et al. 2001: 22-23, 34-36; Sjoberg 2009; see also Sjoberg et al. 2003b: 421-428 for a fuller overview of his perspective on organizations).

The center piece of Sjoberg’s approach is his theory of human agency in relation to bureaucracy / complex organizations, or the social structure-human agency relationship (or macro-micro link) that has long vexed social theorists such as Giddens (1984) and Habermas (1987), and which sociology has struggled to clearly delineate. In a master stroke of innovation he and colleagues (especially Vaughan) combine symbolic interactionist approach with a critical Weberian view of bureaucracy. Specifically they propose that human agents and bureaucracies are closely linked in an asymmetrical, dialectical

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6 This built on a just prior previously published overview of “Bureaucracy as a Social Problem” (Sjoberg 1983) in which he not only reviewed common critiques of bureaucracy but also constructed a critique of the “free market” ideology that ignores the existence of the corporate bureaucracies that cause social harm, drawing in part on Weber’s work. This became a cornerstone of his work for ensuing decades, especially as he came to focus explicitly on bureaucratic capitalism, corporations and human rights (Sjoberg 1999; 2009).
relationship, with bureaucracies (and managerial elites) holding the dominant position while at the same being dependent on individuals and their labor and expertise to do their bidding. Drawing on Mead and Dewey’s conception of the social mind and the ability to “take the role of the other,” they propose that individuals are able to engage in critical reflection, envision alternative social arrangements and to seek change in bureaucratic structures (Sjoberg and Vaughan 1984; 1993: 132-137; Sjoberg 1996; Sjoberg et al. 2001: 31-32; Sjoberg et al. 2003b: 420-421; Sjoberg 2009: 166-168) – thereby breaking free of the Weber’s “iron cage” of bureaucracy. Such reflection and change-seeking has been instrumental in raising the prospect of an admittedly difficult route leading to public accountability for bureaucracies (both governmental and corporate) for their human rights violations, sometimes leading to significant reforms or more drastic sanctions, particularly in cases of gross human rights violations such as post-Apartheid South Africa and post-WWII & Holocaust Germany (Sjoberg 2001; 2009). Moreover, this ability to “take the role of the other”, especially multiple, divergent others, is central to recognizing and promoting human rights (Sjoberg and Vaughan 1993: 136-137; Sjoberg 1996; Sjoberg 1999: 49-51; Sjoberg et al. 2001; Sjoberg et al. 2003b). This conceptualization of the social structure-human agency stands apart in its clarity in specifying how they are related and in what ways human agents are both constrained by yet able to seek change in complex organizations that make up the foundation of social structure, thereby opening the conceptual door to establishing public, moral accountability of organizations (state and corporate) and their elites that violate human rights.

Two more features of Sjoberg’s work bear special attention, his focus on bureaucratic secrecy as well as his preoccupation with the impact of bureaucracy in inequality, especially the most vulnerable groups. First, bureaucratic secrecy always looms large in his Weberian view of powerful organizations, both as means for reinforcing organizational and elite power and a tool for human agency. His interest in bureaucratic secrecy and manipulation goes back to his work the implications of it for social research methods (Sjoberg 1967; Sjoberg and Nett 1968 and 1997; Sjoberg and Miller 1973; Sjoberg et al. 1991; see also Sjoberg 1976 on the hidden side of bureaucracy and the “other economy”.

7 While he is mindful (and critical) of bureaucratic secrecy as a way organizations and their leadership establish greater control and power (to fend off external scrutiny and so on), also notes that those in the lower ranks of the hierarchy and in specialized areas of the division of labor also use secrecy, particularly the informal variety, to protect themselves from abuses of power by the higher-ups. However, Sjoberg and colleagues emphasize the role of formal secrecy of organizations and their elites in enhancing their power and as having the gravest impacts on human rights, particularly on less powerful and disadvantaged groups and individuals –e.g., assassination and torture programs, genocide, politicide,
Watergate, the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s, banking and finance scandals, hidden medical experiments and toxic waste exposure, the monitoring of dissident groups, etc. (Sjoberg et al. 1984b; Sjoberg and Vaughan 1993: 143-144; Sjoberg et al. 1995; Sjoberg 1996: 284-285; Sjoberg et al. 2001: 36-37; Sjoberg 1999: Sjoberg 2009: 168-169). This focus on bureaucratic secrecy is a vital in the understanding of human rights, given of the prominence of the issue in human rights cases in the empirical world, and remarkably that it has been largely neglected by other scholars.

The other prominent remaining theme in Sjoberg's theory of human rights is a concern with the way bureaucratic power structures reinforce and exacerbate social inequality, particularly to the detriment of disadvantaged and subordinated groups, even undermining their human rights. This is most clear in his most profound critique of bureaucracy as practicing “social triage” (analogous to medical triage in desperate situations) whereby he proposes that powerful bureaucracies tend to tend to sacrifice the well-being of the most disadvantaged groups under the rationale of “efficiency.” More specifically, he proposes that the most subordinated, “truly disadvantaged” groups (particularly the very poor among minority groups) are left in their distressed state by the normal operations of bureaucratic power structures that write off their well as well as quashing dissent being because adequately meeting their needs would be “inefficient” in a cost-benefit sense, requiring unacceptable “sacrifices” by privileged elites that control or otherwise benefit from such organizations (Sjoberg 1983, Sjoberg et al 1984b; Sjoberg and Vaughan 1993; Sjoberg 1996; Sjoberg 1999). This notion of “social triage” builds off his long-standing interest in the notion that bureaucracy plays a key role in perpetuating and furthering the social stratification process, particularly in subordinating disadvantaged groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities as well as lower classes (Sjoberg et al. 1966; Sjoberg 1995b; Sjoberg 1996; Saenz et al. 2007). Sjoberg also is concerned with how, on the other hand, bureaucracy also benefits managerial elites, especially in corporations (Sjoberg 1999; 2009). His latest steps in a sociology of human rights have focused on corporations, with an eye toward corporate malfeasance (such as accounting scandals, market manipulation of all types, and mercenary security firms) and its impact on human rights, to

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8 Social triage is analogous to medical triage in severe situations (such as near battle fields) where the most severely wounded are left to die in medical circumstances desperately short of supplies in order to use those supplies to save many more less gravely wounded persons. Likewise, social triage entails sacrificing the well-being of the most needy some in order to enhance [not save, though] others – who are often already privileged. Sjoberg was developing this concept in the 1980s (Sjoberg 1983, Sjoberg et al. 1984b), if not earlier.

9 Sjoberg provides numerous illustrations of "social triage" -- from under-resourced public schools to welfare agencies to corporations hyper-exploiting low-wage workers to economic austerity programs demanded of poor nations by international banking institutions, to for-profit prisons to and the prison industrial complex warehousing of poor minority males to toxic waste dumping in poor areas, to predatory banking practices against the poor (Sjoberg 1983, Sjoberg et al 1984b; Sjoberg and Vaughan 1993; Sjoberg 1996; Sjoberg 1999).
advance the notion of moral accountability of these ever more powerful organizations (Sjoberg 1999; 2005; 2009; Sjoberg et al. 2001). It is worth noting that the United Nations has also begun to take up the issue of corporations and human rights in recent years for perhaps the first time in a sustained way (see U.N. Human Rights Commission 2011).

Finally, Sjoberg envisions ways human rights might come to be more fully realized by drawing on his long-standing interest in the future (Sjoberg and Cain 1971; Sjoberg et al 2003a) and risk (Sjoberg 2005) responding to Beck and Giddens among others. His approach is a distinctive “counter-system” one whereby he and colleagues constructing possible alternatives based on a critique (or negation) of the status quo and examining empirical cases that exhibit some counter-system features in order to construct the outlines for what “might be” (Sjoberg and Cain 1971, Sjoberg et al. 2003a) – an approach he (and others) employs in conceptize ways to reform or constitute complex organizations (both corporate and state) so that they do not undermine human rights (Sjoberg et al 2001; Sjoberg 2009).

Comparison of Theoretical Approaches

Several key points of contrast stand out in more general terms when comparing the theoretical approaches to the sociology of human rights evident in the work of the four authors (or groups) reviewed previously. Blau and Moncada are employ a more discourse oriented approach based in part

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10 His main interest is in using human rights standards to hold corporations morally accountable, particularly in light of the fact that multinational corporations have more resources than do many countries and have tremendous social impacts (Sjoberg 2009: 162). He is particularly concerned about the “corporate control industry” (2005; 2009: 162-163), whereby governmental out-sourcing of coercion and social control to private firms makes public, moral accountability much more difficult to attain. Sjoberg points to the role of corporations (including banks) in the German Nazi and South African apartheid cases to highlight in dramatic fashion the issue of corporate involvement in human rights violations and the need for moral accountability (Sjoberg 2009, Sjoberg et al. 2001). However, Sjoberg also critically examines less drastic yet crucial aspects of corporations with implications for human rights concerns. Among these are corporate market manipulation, the social construction of corporate profits and efficiency via complex accounting (Sjoberg 1999), and the corporate legal framework that grants corporations “limited legal liability” affording protections while also granting “personhood” and extensive rights (Sjoberg 2009).

11 In outlining future possibilities to promote human rights by changing complex organizations, Sjoberg draws on a number of empirical, counter-system cases, such the abolishment of the Nazi’s Gestapo and South Africa’s Apartheid system as well as the significant reforms and penalties forced on holocaust-implicated Swiss banks and German corporations (Sjoberg et al. 2001). In addition, he also proposes courses of action that have not occurred but might (based on a negation of current practices) that he sees as vital to upholding human rights, including a reconceptualization of the legal structure of corporations as rights-bearing “natural persons” but having only “limited liability,” and calling for the prohibition of the for-profit coercion / control activity by “security companies” that has proliferated since the Iraq War (Sjoberg 2009, Sjoberg 2005). Feagin and Vera (2008) have also made extensive use of Sjoberg’s countersystem approach to promote “liberation sociology” in which human rights figure prominently.
on constitutions and international treaties to mount a strong push for the more collective human rights -
- social and economic (and cultural) – based a pointed critique of the drastic inequalities resulting from
the widespread adoption of neo-liberal capitalism around the world. Sassen likewise is largely
preoccupied with economic aspects of globalization, though less critical of them, and she sees the
development of human rights – in the form of denationalized citizenship – as another key aspect of
globalization. Turner is devoted more to a historical overview of social theory in view of rights issues
(citizenship based especially) as well as the philosophical basis for human rights – namely, the
universality of human frailty and vulnerability (as it eventually affects us all); he also recognizes
accelerated globalization as a central factor in the growth of human rights (over citizenship). All of the
afore-mentioned authors employ the larger categories of “capital” and “the state,” or variations, to
frame their discussion. Sjoberg is distinct in making organizational, bureaucratic power structures (state
and corporate) as the focal point of his work, for he sees those social structures as the most
consequential in shaping societies across borders and in impacting human rights, typically adversely and
in reinforcing drastic social inequalities; this is a more specific explanation/orientation than the others’
use of capital and the state. Sjoberg is also interested in the origins of human rights as historically and
socially constructed products, and he is keenly interested in the philosophical moral and ethnical
orientations used in sociology and their relationship to human rights.

Perhaps the key point of contrast, and the most important theoretical issues, is the varying ways
these authors address the relationship between human agency and social structure. All are clearly
interested in this, but nearly all struggle to elucidate this complex relationship in any specific, clear, yet
sophisticated manner. Blau and Moncada are very interested in human agency by subordinated groups
that resists the drastic inequalities rooted in the neo-liberal global economic order and see nearly any
such collective efforts by subordinated groups as human rights work (from landless peasants to workers
coops and so on), making for an bit overly expansive and somewhat vague conceptualization. Sassen
also is concerned with human agency among subordinated groups in the era of accelerating capitalist
globalization and diminishing power of nation states. She focuses on how subordinate groups (e.g.,
working poor immigrants) organize and advocate for their own interests employing some aspects of
globalization (human rights discourse) to gradually secure rights from nation-states, but beyond this she
remains rather vague and does not offer a clear or specific theory of the relationship between human
agency and social structure. Turner devotes less attention to the human agency-social structure
relationship, but he also recognizes its importance for a sociology of human rights. He specifically takes
sociology to task for being overly deterministic about the impact of social structure on individuals,
instead he calls for the field to take up a focus on human agency while acknowledging that social structure places some limits on it. However, he offers little guidance beyond this rather vague plea that covers social action within a vast continuum -- apart from pure volunteerism, on one end, and structural determinism, on the other. On the whole, the view of the relationship between human agency and social structure among these four authors is relatively vague and not well elaborated.

Sjoberg’s work on human agency and social structure, in contrast, stands out for its specificity, clarity, and conceptual elaboration. He is more specific about the social structure (complex organizations / bureaucracy – corporate and state) and how human agency emerges in that context. Based on his laser focus on morally unaccountable organizational power, he proposes that there is a dynamic, asymmetrical relationship between the individual and bureaucracy. Specifically, the latter greatly constrains the former, but the individual, and human actors generally, through their social mind and ability to “take the role of the other” (even multiple, divergent others) can engage in critical reflection and thereby to envision and seek alternatives and change in bureaucracy / social structure. [Somewhat similarly, Blau and Moncada also view of human rights as rooted in human beings’ recognition of the other, but they do not link this to human agency and social structure, except to say it is the basis for mutual solidarity, which appears to be the basis of human agency in their model, but this is not well elaborated.] Thus Sjoberg sees manifold prospects for human agency, despite the overwhelming power of social structure in the dominant form of complex bureaucratic organizations that proliferate in our social landscape. This could be termed a not-quite-iron-cage of bureaucracy that nonetheless affords some, uneven possibilities for human agency and social change, such as the development and use of human rights to evaluate powerful organizations of all types and to at least occasionally hold them morally accountable. This is a specific and clear model of the relationship between human agency and social structure, notably more so then those offered by the other authors reviewed here whose conceptions of this vital relationship are vaguer and much less elucidated, and is derived from both theoretical concepts as well as empirical real world practices, notably the countersystem type.

There are a number of other points on which the authors can be compared – e.g., their degree of emphasis on inequality and on the economy, globalization, the origins and definitions of human rights – but two further issues stand out, the duties/rights relationship and view of the future, a key issue for the 2012 ASA meetings theme of “real utopias.” Apart from Sassen (who focuses on rights only), the other others each address the duties/rights relationship, and are in essential agreement in positing that human rights are not dependent on one’s fulfillment of duties (to the state) but rather exist
unconditionally, though all acknowledge the duties as important in a secondary sense and Turner a bit more so. All recognize the importance of nation-state recognition of rights, first as citizenship and later as human rights, but the latter developed as rights were seen to transcend nation-state delimitation, especially post-WWII, and thereby reducing the importance of formal duties to states. They each see some tension between citizenship rights (more squarely linked to duties) and national sovereignty versus universal, transnational human rights – though Turner is a bit contradictory at times on this and Sassen tries to merge the two into “denationalized citizenship.” Finally, apart from Turner (though he does highlight areas of future human rights concern), each has some significant focus on human rights and the future. Sassen posits that “denationalized citizenship” with its expansion of human rights for disadvantaged groups is occurring in national settings on a gradual, incipient basis that is nonetheless inexorable. Blau and Moncada are much more utopian in proposing alternatives to the status quo, based on specific human rights provisions, and even calling for the re-writing of national constitutions. Sjoberg is both somewhat utopian (though less so) and simultaneously empirically grounded in elaborating a countersystem logic to construct alternative as well as real world countersystem examples that promote human rights moral accountability. The latter approach appears to be most consistent with the 2012 ASA meetings theme of “real utopias.” It is also worth noting that apart from Sassen, the others all view moral frameworks as inherent in sociology, whether one acknowledges them or not, and that the human rights view is the best option.

Before concluding this comparative section on some of the principle works on the sociology of human rights, it is important to note that a number of other sociologists have taken up the theme of human rights as a central concern in recent years. Among the growing ranks is famed communitarian Etzioni who has two recent articles on human rights (2010; 2011), taking up a sort of hierarchical ranking of various human rights (some are more fundamentally important than others) and examining the Obama administration’s foreign policy from a human rights perspective. In the U.K. Woodiwiss has written extensively on human rights, often from a critique of capitalist labor practices and globalization as well as stressing economic, social and cultural rights (Woodiwiss 2005; 2009). Also in the U.K., Nash takes a discourse-centered approach to examining the cultural politics of human rights in the U.S and U.K. as well as the relationship between human rights and democracy (Nash 2009a, Nash 2009b). And Frezzo (2008, 2012) has taken up Blau and Moncada’s approach in focusing on the discourse of international treaties and constitutions, and in taking the view that a wide array of grassroots-led efforts to lessen nearly any type of social inequality constitutes human rights advocacy --- with human rights replacing social problems as a key framing device in sociology. Finally, Hagan (Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond 2008) a sociologist and criminologist has taken up human rights in his co-authored work on genocide in Darfur, drawing on international Human Rights treaties and law. Nonetheless, on the whole, American sociologists are rather under-represented among those sociologists taking up the topic of human rights. Recently several edited volumes devoted to human rights have included with a wide range of US sociologist contributors that mainly seek to apply international human rights norms as per treaties to a wide range of sociological topics (Blau, et al. 2008; Blau and Frezzo, 2012, and Brunsma et al. 2012).

**Immigration and Human Rights**

In immigration matters rights issues become more clearly apparent, and particularly the clash between the citizenship / national sovereignty framework and the human rights perspective (for an overview see Dunn 2009; and Dunn forthcoming). As suggested previously, in the citizenship / national sovereignty framework rights are determined and defined by nation-states and are generally conditional upon fulfilling duties (e.g., paying taxes, following laws, etc.); rights are granted to members (citizens) while their extension to non-members (immigrants) is more uncertain and contingent. Sociology has long focused on the citizenship / national sovereignty as the paradigm for rights (Marshall 1950; Turner 1990; 2009; and see Dunn 2009 for an overview), and it resonates with deep historical precedent. Native women and minority groups have undertaken transformative struggles over many decades historically to gain access to full citizenship, cast as a fight for equality in civil and political rights, and later social rights. Citizenship-based rights have the great advantage of ready avenues of enforceability (albeit imperfect) though nation-state institutions. In the field of immigration, many are committed to maintaining some aspect of a citizenship framework (see Dunn 2009 for an overview). In contrast, as noted previously, in the human rights perspective rights are universal, transnational, and unconditional, but enforceability of them remains the exception rather than the norm. Still, human rights norms do provide a means to evaluate actions by powerful actors that harm the well-being and/or dignity of human beings, especially the disadvantaged, and provide a normative basis for making claims to seek
change, even when the harmful actions in question are in fact “legal” under nation-state guidelines. There is growing body of immigration literature and related key empirical issues that illustrate this tension and need for a human rights framework for the quintessential non-members or marginalized members of US society, particularly in the US-Mexico border region. I will briefly review several of them, as well as several key on-going issues, and note their implications for various rights frameworks.

The US has massively expanded its immigration and other border enforcement efforts in the last two decades. This is reflected in the enormous increase in resources devoted to the US Border Patrol since the mid 1990s. From 1993 to 2011 Border Patrol funding jumped 895% (to $3.6 billion per year) and staffing has shot up 432% to 21,444 agents, over 85% of whom are posted along the US-Mexico border (Dunn 2009, 205-206, Border Patrol 2011a, 2011b, Rosenblum 2012: 12-15). A number of other escalations of border enforcement have also been put into place along the US-Mexico border by US authorities. Since 1994, the official US policy along the US-Mexico border has been to promote “prevention through deterrence,” in which the US Border Patrol has sought to deter unauthorized border crossing / immigration through highly visible deployments of enforcement resources in or near key urban areas on the border where the vast majority of such crossings had long taken place (US Border Patrol 1994, 7, 8-12; Office of Border Patrol 2004; Dunn 2009, 1-2; see also Nevins 2010; Maril 2004; Andreas 2009; Spener 2009). This strategy was pioneered in the El Paso, Texas, Border Patrol sector in September of 1993, and then subsequently became border-wide strategy; it is rooted in part in a successful federal lawsuit alleging widespread civil rights abuses by Border Patrol agents against Hispanic citizens and legal resident immigrants (see Dunn 2009). One of the most visible escalations in recent years is the construction of over 630 miles of new fencing / walls along the 1,900 mile-long border – a combination of lower fencing to prevent vehicle crossing and two layers of pedestrian fencing / wall (over 3 meters high) to keep out people – nearly all built since the passage of the ‘Secure Fence
Act” in 2006. This new “Berlin wall” was constructed mainly to prevent unauthorized immigration; it
seems to be the longest modern border barrier in the world. In addition to the new physical border
barriers, the US Department of Homeland Security has also tried in vain since 2006 to create an $8
billion “virtual fence,” termed SBInet (Secure Border Initiative network), of pervasive electronic
surveillance along the US-Mexico border that has thus far failed on any significant scale. And more
recently, the Border Patrol has turned to military technology more explicitly, with the use six aerial
drones (unstaffed aerial vehicles, UAV's) to conduct surveillance along the southwest border
(Rosenblum 2012; Isacson and Meyer 2012; Dunn 2009, 222-223).

A more drastic escalation of the national sovereignty approach to the border has been the
expanded, more overt militarization of the border for immigration enforcement purposes in recent
years, despite the fact that unauthorized immigrants pose little to no physical threat to the country (for
background, see Dunn 1996). From mid-2006 through mid-2008, the Bush administration sent 6,000
National Guard troops to the US Mexico border to assist the Border Patrol (mainly via surveillance),
expressly for immigration enforcement purposes at a time when the issue was growing in political
prominence. (Dunn 2009, 218-219, 225-227). In the summer of 2010, the Obama administration
resumed this on a smaller scale with some 1,500 National Guard troops through the end of 2011
(Isacson and Meyer 2012). In addition, since 2004 active duty US military troops have been used on a
smaller scale periodically to explicitly assist the Border Patrol in immigration (& drug) enforcement,
again often conducting surveillance missions with high-tech military gear, and on several occasions even
using tank-like Stryker armored personnel carriers (see Dunn 2009, 180-181; Isacson and Meyer 2012).
In addition, armed vigilante “volunteer militia” groups have emerged along the border since 2005
(largely disbanded by 2012), mainly in Arizona, expressly to uphold US national sovereignty against
unauthorized immigrants by monitoring the border, reporting observed unauthorized border crossers to
the Border Patrol, and sometimes even making “citizens arrests” / apprehensions (see Doty 2009;
Cabrera 2012). Much of this military and vigilante militia activity has been motivated by heightened “national security” concerns in the post-September 11th world of anti-terrorism.

In turn, this series of drastic immigration enforcement efforts along the US-Mexico border, making it more difficult to cross illegally, has led to a sharp increase in border crossing deaths among unauthorized immigrants, particularly in Arizona. More than 6,100 bodies were recovered from 1994-2011, a doubling of the death rate from approximately two hundred to four hundred per year (Rosenblum 2012: 30; Isacson and Meyer 2012, 40; Dunn 2009, 2; Jimenez 2009; see also Eschbach et al. 1999, 2001; Massey et al. 2002; Massey 2007). Although Border Patrol apprehensions have dropped some 75% from 2006-2011 (Rosenblum 2012: 20) [whether due to the economic crisis and falling US labor demand since 2007, or increased border enforcement, or both], migrant crossing deaths have remained relatively high and fallen only approximately 25% during the same time. The American Public Health Association in 2009 designated these mounting border crossing deaths as a “public health crisis” and stated that the “Border Patrol should comply with international standards of health and human rights by adopting policies and strategies that do not endanger the lives and health of migrants” (APHA 2009). In addition, there have long been periodic questionable Border Patrol shootings of suspects as well as less severe rights abuses such as denial of due process, beatings, inhuman detention conditions, verbal and psychological abuse, and so on by US authorities along the US-Mexico border in the name of immigration and border enforcement (Frey 2012; No More Deaths 2011; Border Network for Human Rights 2003; Amnesty International 1998; Immigration law Enforcement Monitoring Project 1998; US Commission on Civil Rights 1997; Human Rights Watch 1995). [However, it is important to point out that migrant rights abuses by Mexican authorities are much worse overall (see Amnesty International 2010).]

And Arizona’s SB 1070, passed in 2010 and partially upheld by the Supreme Court in June 2012, seems destined to increase racial / ethnic profiling of Latinos in the state (Saenz et al. 2012). The accumulation of federal and state enforcement measures targeting Latino immigrants amounts to “legal violence” in
the analysis of Menjívar and Abrego (2012) where in these legal measures cause mounting fear among immigrants (especially of family separation due to deportation) that makes them more vulnerable to hyper exploitation, crime, and other forms of victimization.

In the face of this massive border immigration enforcement it is important to note that there have been efforts to resist and challenge it – from the aid provided to unauthorized immigrants by humanitarian groups (often faith-based in part) in the deserts of Arizona and elsewhere (Hagan 2008; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2008; Rose 2012; Cabrera 2012), to local and regional human rights activists (Dunn 2009; Cabrera 2012), to migrant self-help, small-scale human smugglers aiding unauthorized crossers to evade enforcement to come work in the US (Spener 2009), to the massive 2006 and 2007 immigrant rights protests in cities across the country including the border region. While this has been a massively uphill struggle at best, and involves risk of prosecution for some, it does illustrate the resilience of human agency to affect change for human rights in the face of overwhelming odds and forms of structural violence of “global apartheid” of heightened exclusion of desperate workers and their families from low-wage nations (Nevins 2012, Spener 2008), the use of laws to increase fear and further subordination of immigrants once in the country (Menjívar and Abrego 2012).

To briefly conclude, these developments can be interpreted from a variety of perspectives on rights in sociology. The massive build-up of border immigration enforcement apparatus in recent decades is entirely consistent with the citizenship / national sovereignty framework generally, for it determining who is allowed in, keeping the unauthorized out (or trying to), and upholding borders is crucial to national sovereignty and determining who is a member and citizen, and thus eligible for rights (Agamben 1995). That this build-up is often cast in terms of protecting the nation and its citizens from “transnational threats” and “transnational criminal organizations” – e.g., terrorism, drug traffickers, international criminal networks including human smugglers, etc. (Barry 2011) – likewise fits the paradigm, however erroneous or debatable the fit to reality of very low crimes rates along the border (Isacson and Meyer 2012). And the hundreds of deaths per year of unauthorized border crossers, nearly all non-threatening, labor migrants and family members, is entirely legal and justified in this framework,
though also very tragic. However, in the human rights framework, these migrant deaths are an injustice caused largely by state policy, for which the state and its border enforcement organizations should be held accountable. In terms of the various sociology of human rights views reviewed previously, this could be interpreted and analyzed in a variety of ways – as a nation state violating international human rights provisions (ala Blau and Moncada), or a heightening of human vulnerability/frailty by the state if not also the repressive capacity of the state (as per Turner), or a reaction against globalization and a “re-nationalizing” or citizenship and “re-bordering,” likely to be overwhelmed, however (ala Sassen), or an expression of bureaucratic power severely undermining the human dignity of an already very disadvantaged group, essentially writing off or sacrificing their well being, “social triage” (ala Sjoberg). I find the latter most analytically insightful and compelling. Meanwhile, the expression of a range of mainly small scale challenges to and resistance of the much heighten immigration and border enforcement by US agencies illustrates the sort of human agency by subordinated group actors and their allies that all of the sociologists of human rights discussed here are interested in and theorize at least somewhat. On one hand we could see this as a resistance by disadvantaged classes and ethnic groups to the state policies violating human rights and validation of human agency not being precluded by social structure (ala Turner), or as challenges by and even solidarity among subordinated groups and their allies to the ravages of neo-liberal global capitalism that compels so many to undertake such a risky migration journey and live in precarious circumstances here filling needs in US labor markets (ala Blau and Moncada as well as Sassen). Perhaps the most useful interpretation is that these efforts illustrate part of the asymmetrical, dynamic relationship between human agents (especially the disadvantaged and dissidents) and bureaucratic power structures (state and corporate) seeking to keep them out or down once in, heavily informed by the critical reflection of the former actors (ala Sjoberg). The latter seems most insightful and helpful in seeing the way forward to advance human rights.
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