8. But the mind errs, when it so lovingly and
intimately connects itself with these images [i.e. percepts acquired in its
exterior life], as even to consider itself to be something of the same kind. For
so it is conformed to them to some extent, not by being this, but by thinking
it is so: not that it thinks itself to be an image, but outright that very
thing itself of which it entertains the image. For there still lives in it the
power of distinguishing the corporeal thing which it leaves without, from the
image of that corporeal thing which it contains therefrom
within itself: except when these images are so projected as if felt without and
not thought within, as in the case of people who are asleep, or mad, or in a
trance.
9. When, therefore, it thinks itself to be
something of this kind, it thinks itself to be a corporeal thing; and since it
is perfectly conscious of its own superiority, by which it rules the body, it
has hence come to pass that the question has been raised what part of the body
has the greater power in the body; and the opinion has been held that this is
the mind, nay, that it is even the whole soul altogether. And some accordingly
think it to be the blood, others the brain, others the heart; not as the
Scripture says, "I will praise Thee, O Lord, with my whole heart;"
[Psalm 9:1] and, "Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thine heart;" [Deuteronomy 6:5] for this word by
misapplication or metaphor is transferred from the body to the soul; but they
have simply thought it to be that small part itself of the body, which we see
when the inward parts are rent asunder. Others, again, have believed the soul
to be made up of very minute and individual corpustules,
which they call atoms, meeting in themselves and
cohering. Others have said that its substance is air, others fire. Others have
been of opinion that it is no substance at all, since they could not think any
substance unless it is body, and they did not find that the soul was body; but
it was in their opinion the tempering together itself of our body, or the
combining together of the elements, by which that flesh is as it were
conjoined. And hence all of these have held the soul to be mortal; since, whether
it were body, or some combination of body, certainly it could not in either
case continue always without death. But they who have held its substance to be
some kind of life the reverse of corporeal, since they have found it to be a
life that animates and quickens every living body, have by consequence striven
also, according as each was able, to prove it immortal, since life cannot be
without life.
For as to that fifth kind of body, I know not
what, which some have added to the four well-known elements of the world, and
have said that the soul was made of this, I do not think we need spend time in
discussing it in this place. For either they mean by body what we mean by it,
viz., that of which a part is less than the whole in extension of place, and
they are to be reckoned among those who have believed the mind to be corporeal:
or if they call either all substance, or all changeable substance, body,
whereas they know that not all substance is contained in extension of place by
any length and breadth and height, we need not contend with them about a
question of words.
10. Now,
in the case of all these opinions, any one who sees that the nature of the mind
is at once substance, and yet not corporeal,-that is, that it does not occupy a
less extension of place with a less part of itself, and a greater with a
greater,-must needs see at the same time that they who are of opinion that it
is corporeal do not err from defect of knowledge concerning mind, but because
they associate with it qualities without which they are not able to conceive
any nature at all. For if you bid them conceive of existence that is without
corporeal phantasms, they hold it merely nothing. And so the mind would not
seek itself, as though wanting to itself. For what is so
present to knowledge as that which is present to the mind? Or what is so present to the mind as the mind itself? And hence what is
called "invention" [invenire] if we consider the origin of the word, what else
does it mean, unless that to find out is to "come into" that which is
sought? Those things accordingly which come into the mind as it were of
themselves, are not usually said to be found out, although they may be said to
be known; since we did not endeavor by seeking to come into them, that is to
invent or find them out. And therefore, as the mind itself really seeks those
things which are sought by the eyes or by any other sense of the body (for the
mind directs even the carnal sense, and then finds out or invents, when that
sense comes to the things which are sought); so, too, it finds out or “invenes” other things which it ought to know, not with the
medium of corporeal sense, but through itself, when it "comes into"
them; and this, whether in the case of the higher substance that is in God, or
of the other parts of the soul; just as it does when it judges of bodily images
themselves, for it finds these within, in the soul, impressed through the body.
11. It is then a wonderful question,
in what manner the soul seeks and finds itself; at what it aims in order to
seek, or whither it comes. that it may come into or
find out. For what is so much in the mind as she mind itself? But because it is
in those things which it thinks of with love, and is wont to be in
sensible, that is, in corporeal things with love, it is unable to be in itself
without the images of those corporeal things. And hence shameful error arises
to block its way, whilst it cannot separate from itself the images of sensible
things, so as to see itself alone. For they have marvellously
cohered with it by the close adhesion of love. And herein consists its
uncleanness; since, while it strives to think of itself alone, it fancies
itself to be that, without which it cannot think of itself. When, therefore, it
is bidden to become acquainted with itself, let it not seek itself as though it
were withdrawn from itself; but let it withdraw that which it has added to
itself. For itself lies more deeply within, not only than those sensible
things, which are clearly without, but also than the images of them; which are
indeed in some part of the soul, viz., that which beasts also have,
although these want understanding, which is proper to the mind. As therefore
the mind is within, it goes forth in some sort from itself, when it exerts the
affection of love towards these, as it were, footprints of many acts of
attention. And these footprints are, as it were, imprinted on the memory, at
the time when the corporeal things which are without are perceived in such way,
that even when those corporeal things are absent, yet the images of them are at
hand to those who think of them. Therefore let the mind become acquainted with
itself, and not seek itself as if it were absent; but fix upon itself the act
of [voluntary] attention, by which it was wandering among other things, and let
it think of itself. So it will see that at no time did it ever not love itself,
at no time did it ever not know itself; but by loving another thing together
with itself it has confounded itself with it, and in some sense has grown one
with it. And so, while it embraces diverse things, as though they were one, it
has come to think those things to be one which are diverse.
12. Let it not therefore seek to discern
itself as though absent, but take pains to discern itself
as present. Nor let it take knowledge of itself as if it did not know itself,
but let it distinguish itself from that which it knows to be another. For how
will it take pains to obey that very precept which is given it, "Know thyself," if it knows not either what "know"
means or what "thyself" means? But if it knows both, then it knows
also itself. Since "know thyself" is not so
said to the mind as is "Know the cherubim and the seraphim;" for they
are absent, and we believe concerning them, and according to that belief they
are declared to be certain celestial powers. Nor yet again as it is said, Know the
will of that man: for this it is not within our reach to perceive at all,
either by sense or understanding, unless by corporeal signs actually set forth;
and this in such a way that we rather believe than understand. Nor again as it
is said to a man, Behold thy own face; which he can
only do in a looking-glass. For even our own face itself is out of the reach of
our own seeing it; because it is not there where our look can be directed. But
when it is said to the mind, Know thyself; then it knows itself by that very
act by which it understands the word "thyself;" and this for no other
reason than that it is present to itself. But if it does not understand what is
said, then certainly it does not do as it is bid to do. And therefore it is
bidden to do that thing which it does do, when it understands the very precept
that bids it.
13. Let it not then add anything to that
which it knows itself to be, when it is bidden to know itself. For it knows, at
any rate, that this is said to itself; namely, to the self that is, and that
lives, and that understands. But a dead body also is, and cattle live; but
neither a dead body nor cattle understand. Therefore it so knows that it so is,
and that it so lives, as an understanding is and lives. When, therefore, for
example's sake, the mind thinks itself air, it thinks that air understands; it
knows, however, that itself understands, but it does not know itself to be air,
but only thinks so. Let it separate that which it thinks itself; let it discern
that which it knows; let this remain to it, about which not even have they
doubted who have thought the mind to be this corporeal thing or that. For
certainly every mind does not consider itself to be air; but some think
themselves fire, others the brain, and some one kind of corporeal thing, others
another, as I have mentioned before; yet all know that they themselves
understand, and are, and live; but they refer understanding to that which they
understand, but to be, and to live, to themselves. And no one doubts, either
that no one understands who does not live, or that no one lives of whom it is
not true that he is; and that therefore by consequence that which understands
both is and lives; not as a dead body is which does not live, nor as a soul
lives which does not understand, but in some proper and more excellent manner.
Further, they know that they will, and they equally know that no one can will
who is not and who does not live; and they also refer that will itself to
something which they will with that will. They know also that they remember;
and they know at the same time that nobody could remember, unless he both was
and lived; but we refer memory itself also to something, in that we remember
those things. Therefore the knowledge and science of many things are contained
in two of these three, memory and understanding; but will must be present, that
we may enjoy or use them. For we enjoy things known, in which things themselves
the will finds delight for their own sake, and so reposes; but we use those
things, which we refer to some other thing which we are to enjoy. Neither is
the life of man vicious and culpable in any other way, than as wrongly using
and wrongly enjoying. But it is no place here to discuss this.
14. But since we treat of the nature of the
mind, let us remove from our consideration all knowledge which is received from
without, through the senses of the body; and attend more carefully to the position
which we have laid down, that all minds know and are certain concerning themselves. For men certainly have doubted whether the power
of living, of remembering, of understanding, of willing, of thinking, of
knowing, of judging, be of air, or of fire, or of the brain, or of the blood,
or of atoms, or besides the usual four elements of a fifth kind of body, I know
not what; or, whether the combining or tempering together of this our flesh
itself has power to accomplish these things. And one has attempted to establish
this, and another to establish that. Yet who ever doubts that he himself lives,
and remembers, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges?
Seeing that even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he
doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to
be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not
know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to assent rashly. Whosoever
therefore doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt of all these things;
which if they were not, he would not be able to doubt of anything.
15. They who think the mind to be either a
body or the combination or tempering of the body, will have all these things to
seem to be in a subject, so that the substance is air, or fire, or some other
corporeal thing, which they think to be the mind; but that the understanding (intelligentia) is in this corporeal thing as its
quality, so that this corporeal tiring is the subject, but the understanding is
in the subject: viz. that the mind is the subject, which they judge to
be a corporeal thing, but the understanding [intelligence], or any other of
those things which we have mentioned as certain to us, is in that subject. They
also hold nearly the same opinion who deny the mind itself to be body, but
think it to be the combination or tempering together of the body; for there is
this difference, that the former say that the mind itself is the substance, in
which the understanding [intelligence] is, as in a subject; but the latter say
that the mind itself is in a subject, viz. in the body, of which it is the
combination or tempering together. And hence, by consequence, what else can
they think, except that the understanding also is in the same body as in a
subject?
16. And all these do not perceive that the
mind knows itself, even when it seeks for itself, as we have already shown. But
nothing is at all rightly said to be known while its substance is not known.
And therefore, when the mind knows itself, it knows its own substance; and when
it is certain about itself, it as certain about its own substance. But it is
certain about itself, as those things which are said,
above prove convincingly; although it is not at all certain whether itself is
air, or fire, or some body, or some function of body. Therefore it is not any
of these. And to that whole which is bidden to know itself, belongs this, that
it is certain that it is not any of those things of which it is uncertain, and
is certain that it is that only, which only it is certain that it is. For it thinks in this way of fire, or air, and whatever else of the
body it thinks of. Neither can it in any way be brought to pass that it
should so think that which itself is, as it thinks that which itself is not.
Since it thinks all these things through an imaginary phantasy,
whether fire, or air, or this or that body. or that
part or combination and tempering together of the body: nor assuredly is it
said to be all those things, but some one of them. But if it were any one of
them, it would think this one in a different manner from the rest viz.
not through an imaginary phantasy, as absent things
are thought, which either themselves or some of like kind have been touched by
the bodily sense; but by some inward, not feigned, but true presence (for
nothing is more present to it than itself); just as it thinks that itself
lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills. For it knows these things in itself, and does not imagine them as though it had touched
them by the sense outside itself, as corporeal things are touched. And if it
attaches nothing to itself from the thought of these things, so as to think
itself to be something of the kind, then whatsoever remains to it from itself
that alone is itself.
17. Putting aside, then, for a
little while all other things, of which the mind is certain concerning itself,
let us especially consider and discuss these three-memory, understanding, will.
For we may commonly discern in these three the character of the abilities of
the young also; since the more tenaciously and easily a boy remembers, and the
more acutely he understands, and the more ardently he studies, the more
praiseworthy is he in point of ability. But when the question is about any
one's learning, then we ask not how solidly and easily he remembers, or how
shrewdly he understands; but what it is that he remembers, and what it is that
he understands. And because the mind is regarded as praiseworthy, not only as
being learned, but also as being good, one gives heed not only to what he
remembers and what he understands, but also to what he wills (velit); not how ardently he wills, but first what it
is he wills, and then how greatly he wills it. For the mind that loves eagerly
is then to be praised, when it loves that which ought to be loved eagerly.
Since, then, we speak of these three-ability, knowledge, use-the first of these
is to be considered under the three heads, of what a man can do in memory, and
understanding, and will. The second of them is to be considered in regard to
that which any one has in his memory and in his understanding, which he has
attained by a studious will. But the third, viz. use, lies in the will,
which handles those things that are contained in the memory and understanding,
whether it refer them to anything further, or rest satisfied with them as an
end. For to use, is to take up something into the power of the will; and to
enjoy, is to use with joy, not any longer of hope, but of the actual thing.
Accordingly, every one who enjoys, uses; for he takes up something into the
power of the will, wherein he also is satisfied as with an end.
But not every one who uses, enjoys, if he has sought
after that, which he takes up into the power of the will, not on account of the
thing itself, but on account of something else.
18. Since, then, these three,
memory, understanding, wills are not three lives, but one life; nor three
minds, but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three
substances, but one substance. Since memory, which is called life, and mind,
and substance, is so called in respect to itself; but it is called memory,
relatively to something. And I should say the same also of understanding and of
will, since they are called understanding and will relatively to something; but
each in respect to itself is life, and mind, and essence. And hence these three
are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else
they are severally called in respect to themselves, they are called also
together, not plurally, but in the singular number.
But they are three, in that wherein they are mutually referred to each other;
and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each, but also each to
all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only is each
contained by each, but also all by each. For I remember that I have memory and
understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and will, and
remember; and I will that I will, and remember, and understand; and I remember
together my whole memory, and understanding, and will. For that of my memory
which I do not remember, is not in my memory; and nothing is so much in the
memory as memory itself. Therefore I remember the whole memory. Also, whatever
I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will;
but whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember the whole of my
understanding, and the whole of my will. Likewise, when I understand these
three things, I understand them together as whole. For there is none of things
intelligible which I do not understand, except what I do not know; but what I
do not know, I neither remember, nor will. Therefore, whatever of things
intelligible I do not understand, it follows also that I neither remember nor
will. And whatever of things intelligible I remember and will, it follows that
I understand. My will also embraces my whole understanding and my whole memory
whilst I use the whole that I understand and remember. And, therefore, while
all are mutually comprehended by each, and as wholes, each as a whole is equal
to each as a whole, and each as a whole at the same
time to all as wholes; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one
essence.
19. Are we, then, now to go
upward, with whatever strength of purpose we may, to that chiefest
and highest essence, of which the human mind is an inadequate image, yet an
image? Or are these same three things to be yet more distinctly made plain in
the soul, by means of those things which we receive from without, through the
bodily sense, wherein the knowledge of corporeal things is impressed upon us in
time? Since we found the mind itself to be such in its own memory, and
understanding, and will, that since it was understood always to know and always
to will itself. it was understood also at the same
time always to remember itself, always to understand and love itself, although
not always to think of itself as separate from those things which are
not itself; and hence its memory of itself, and understanding of itself, are
with difficulty discerned in it. For in this case, where these two things are
very closely conjoined, and one is not preceded by the other by any time at
all, it looks as if they were not two things, but one called by two names; and
love itself is not so plainly felt to exist when the sense of need does not
disclose it, since what is loved is always at hand. And hence these things may
be more lucidly set forth, even to men of duller minds, if such topics are
treated of as are brought within reach of the mind in time, and happen to it in
time; while it remembers what it did not remember before, and sees what it did
not see before, and loves what it did not love before. But this discussion
demands now another beginning, by reason of the measure of the present book.